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CA CORPORATE MOITORSHIPS IMPROVE CORPORATE COMPLIACE?
Cristie Ford1 and David Hess2
Over the last few years, prosecutors and SEC enforcement attorneys have
increasingly relied on settlement agreements (such as deferred prosecution agreements)
to combat securities violations and other corporate criminal acts. Many of these
agreements require the use of corporate monitors to oversee the corporation’s
compliance with the settlement and its implementation of a compliance program to
prevent future violations of the law. Although these agreements have received significant
attention from legislators and scholars, there has been no investigation into the critically
important question of whether or not the use of corporate monitors achieves its intended
goals. Based primarily on interviews with individuals directly involved in monitorships,
we look at the entire monitorship process—including the selection of the monitor, how
the monitor conducts his or her work, and what happens after a monitorship—and find
that decisions at critical points during this process lead to monitorships that are
significantly less ambitious than government pronouncements behind them and seem
unlikely to achieve their goals on any consistent basis. After identifying these problems,
we suggest measures for reform.
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I.

Introduction

The use of corporate monitorships as part of settlement agreements with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) is now a
common feature of corporate crime enforcement. 3 These agencies have placed monitors
in such well-known corporations as America Online, Bank of New York, Boeing,
KPMG, and Monsanto. The monitor’s role is to ensure that the corporation meets the
terms of its settlement agreement, such as a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), 4
which typically requires that the corporation end its wrongful practices and develop and
implement an improved compliance program to prevent future violations.5
Although some argue that settlement agreements with monitorships are a “stroke
of genius,” since the government can achieve all it wants out of a conviction (e.g.,
admission of guilt by the company and the implementation of reforms) without the costs
of a complete investigation and trial,6 critics abound. Some argue that the terms of these
3

For an overview of the use of settlements, see generally Benjamin M. Greenblum, 5ote: What Happens to
a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1863 (2005); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006); Jennifer O’Hare, The Use of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement
Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89 (2006); Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution,
93 VA. L. REV. 853, 856 (2007).
4

For the purposes of this article, our reference to DPAs refers to both deferred prosecution agreements and
non-prosecution agreements.

5

Orland, supra note 3, at 72.

6

Interview with Jan Handzlik, Partner, Howrey, Los Angeles, California, CORP.CRIME REP., Sept. 10,
2007, at 12, 12-13. In SEC settlement agreements, the party typically does not admit guilt. See SEC v.
Baker Hughes Incorporated and Roy Fearnley, Civil Action No. H-07-1408, Litigation Release No. 20,094
at ¶ 6 (Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20094.htm (stating that

3

settlement agreements are too lenient and corporations should be criminally convicted for
their actions.7 Others take the opposite view and argue that these agreements are too
punitive and that monitors have the potential to run amok over corporations.8 Critics also
claim conflicts of interest have led to the selection of monitors based on personal or
political connections rather than competency.9 Members of Congress have noted these
controversies and have taken action, including a hearing by the House Judiciary
Committee10 and the proposal of two bills to regulate the use of monitors.11 In response,
the DOJ attempted to stave off legislative interference by issuing new guidelines on the
use of monitors.12
Missing from this debate, however, is research into the critically important
question of whether or not monitorships actually achieve their intended goals.13 This
article takes a first step toward addressing that question and focuses on the basic issue of
whether settlement agreements with corporate monitors actually work to improve
corporate behavior going forward. That is, can monitorships be justified on the basis of
improving a corporation’s development and implementation of an effective compliance
program? Also, if monitorships are falling short of these goals, are there reforms that can
be implemented to improve their performance? Thus, the goal of this article is to provide
an initial exploration into how monitorships actually work in practice. To do this, our
analysis is based in significant part on our interviews with individuals directly involved
in the monitorship process, including corporate monitors, regulators, and compliance
consultants.14

“Without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, Baker Hughes has consented to the entry of
a final judgment . . .”)
7

See Crime without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and 5on Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP.
(5ational Press Club, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 28, 2005, at 3-10, available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm.

8

See O’Hare, supra note 3, at 90.

9

See infra note 149 and accompanying text (noting the controversy resulting from the selection of former
US Attorney General John Ashcroft as a corporate monitor).
10

Hearing on Deferred Prosecution: Should Corporate Settlement Agreements Be without Guidelines?
Hearings before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, 110th
Cong. (March 11, 2008), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_031108_2.html).
11

See infra note 150.

12

See infra note 153.

13

Exceptions of academic research focused specifically on corporate monitors include O’Hare, supra note
3 and Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The 5ew Corporate Czar,
105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007). O’Hare, however, focuses on only on one example---Richard Breeden’s
monitorship at WorldCom. Khanna and Dickinson focus primarily on a theoretical analysis of when
monitorships should be used instead of financial penalties and whether or not monitors should have duties
to the corporation. Other research has focused on the issue of whether the government is abusing its power
in reaching settlement agreements (e.g., by requiring corporations to waive attorney-client privilege). See
Earl J. Silbert and Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of
Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225 (2006).

14

See infra Part IV.
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This article proceeds by first providing a brief description of monitorships as
currently used. This part also provides a discussion of the use of similar monitor-type
arrangements in other settings that have influenced the current use of monitorships. Part
III then shows the evolution of corporate compliance programs over time, which have
gone from a focus on technical compliance with specific issues to broader programs that
are integrated into the corporation’s culture and business operations. This is an important
discussion, since monitorships are intended to ensure that corporations have implemented
an effective compliance program. Part IV provides an analysis of monitorships in
practice. Based on interviews with those involved in monitorships and on secondary data,
we investigate the entire monitorship process including the scope of the monitor’s duties
under the agreement, the selection of the individual to serve as monitor, how the monitor
conducts his work in practice, and finally what occurs after the monitorship ends. In
general, we find that the cumulative result of decisions made with respect to each of those
issues during the process leads to monitorships that are significantly less ambitious than
government pronouncements behind them, and are at risk of not achieving their goals on
any consistent basis. Part V then provides recommendations for reforms to help ensure
that monitorships are crafted to meet the challenges at hand in any specific case and to
create a process to allow them to improve over time based on experience.
II.

The Past and Present of Monitorships
A.

Current Use of Monitorships

The use of corporate monitorships as currently structured is relatively new. The
DOJ has imposed at least 44 monitorships as part of settlement agreements with
corporations, almost all of which date from 2003 or later,15 which is the post-Enron, postSarbanes Oxley Act era. The SEC has often participated with the DOJ in its
monitorships,16 along with using them on their own.17 As discussed further below, the
SEC has a longer history with monitorships that has evolved over time. Although
different terminology is used to describe the monitorship18 and there is variation in the
details of the monitor’s duties, they all have the same basic structure, which is that the
corporation is to retain at its own expense a monitor to oversee its compliance with the
15

Our count of the number of DOJ monitorships comes from the DOJ’s letter to the House Committee on
the Judiciary. The letter listed 41 monitorships, with all but three of those occurring in 2003 or later. Letter
to John Conyers Jr., Chairman of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, from Brian A. Benczowski, Principal
Deputy Assistant General, May 15, 2008, at 5 (copy on file with authors). The DOJ noted in the letter that
this may not be a complete list. Id. at 2. Since the letter, and as of the time this article was originally
drafted, the DOJ has entered three additional monitorships. See infra note 168 and accompanying text
(discussing the cases of AGA Medical, Faro Technologies, and Willbros).

16

See Schnizter Steel Industries, Deferred Prosecution Agreement (2006), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/Schnitzer061016.pdf;
Schnitzer
Steel
Industries, SEC Admin. Proceeding, (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/3454606.pdf.

17

See Delta and Pine Land Company, SEC
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56138.pdf

Admin.

Proceeding,

(2007),

available

at

18

In some cases the monitor is referred to as an “independent consultant” or “independent examiner,” for
example.

5

settlement agreement and its implementation of required reforms, such as an improved
compliance program.19 Over a period usually between 18 and 36 months, the monitor will
continue to review the corporation’s implementation of the reforms and report back to the
relevant government agents on the corporation’s progress.
In the Parts that follow we will provide more detail on the use of monitorships in
theory and in practice. This Part, however, provides a brief history of monitorships and
how they have evolved over time in their use in corporations and other organizations.
This history helps provide a lens through which to view the current use of monitorships.
B.

Forerunners to Corporate Monitorships
1.

Mobs, Prisons, and Private Inspector Generals

Corporate monitorships have a direct history in public law litigation and in labor
union corruption cases brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO).20 Public law litigation refers to lawsuits filed against such
public institutions as schools, prisons, police and fire departments, and mental health
facilities, where the plaintiffs seek court involvement in restructuring the organizations
involved and ongoing monitoring of the implementation process.21 To monitor a consent
decree, the court appoints an independent third party to oversee the defendant’s
implementation efforts. The third party—such as a referee, monitor, or special master—
could be assigned different powers ranging from simply reporting back to the court on the
defendant’s performance to making adjudicative decisions.22 In certain cases, such as
with prisons, the court-appointed trustees had experience in other prison trusteeships and
were possibly working multiple trusteeships at the same time.23
In addition to these public institutions, monitors were imposed in DOJ lawsuits
against labor unions under RICO that were resolved with consent decrees. These
monitors served as trustees that were charged with attempting to reform unions that were
under the control of organized crime. The trusteeships varied considerably in terms of
how they operated and the powers granted to the trustees. In some cases, the trustees had
powers equivalent to the union’s officers, including the power to negotiate contracts and
initiate strikes.24 In other cases, the trustee did not even have the power to remove corrupt

19

See infra Part IV.A.3

20

Garrett, supra note 3, at 857, 869-74.

21

For a general review, see generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1022-53 (2004); see also Susan P. Sturm, A
5ormative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355 (1991).
22

Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Re-form Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REV. 725, 732-35, 746-49 (1986) (distinguishing between the powers of a monitor and special master).
23

JAMES B. JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS 246 (2006).

24

James B. Jacobs et al., The RICO Trusteeship after Twenty Years: A Progress Report, 19 LAB. LAW. 419,
427-28 (2004).
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union members.25 The duration of the trusteeship could be indefinite or for a fixed term
as short as 18 months.26
The trustees—who were almost always ex-prosecutors27—had to develop their
reform strategies on their own, since the trustees did not issue public reports and there
was very little, if any, contact between trustees.28 Thus, they were largely unable to learn
from the successes and failures of others.29 Overall, some of these cases were successful,
but others were not.30 They were influential, however, as many of the monitors we
interviewed believed that idea for monitorships came from union trusteeships.
The Independent Private Sector Inspectors General (IPSIG) model is similar.
These monitors got their start in New York in the 1990s helping New York City ensure
that companies contracting with the city were not engaging in fraud, overbilling, or other
violations of law.31 The individuals were placed in contractors to oversee their billing
practices, completion of work claimed to be performed, and other practices. One offshoot
has been IAIPSIG, the International Association of Independent Private Sector Inspectors
General, which seeks to promote the use, integrity and professionalism of Independent
Inspector Generals.32
2.

Corporations and Monitors

The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC has used court-ordered
receiverships as part of its civil enforcement suits since at least the 1960s.33 The
receiverships initially served a traditional asset preservation role, ensuring that the assets
of the corporation were not subject to misappropriation or waste by management.34 Over
time, SEC receiverships evolved to serve the goal of ensuring the corporation would
comply with securities laws in the future.35 Although receiverships were used for solvent,
ongoing corporations, as opposed to receiverships in bankruptcy, the receiver was an
officer of the court with duties to the receivership estate, which made it difficult for the
25

Id. at 428, n.49.

26

Id. at 426-27.

27

Id. at 424-25.

28

Id. at 433-34.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 452; see also Jacobs, supra note 23, at 242-45 (providing a list of the trusteeships and a review of
whether or not each was successful).

31

James B. Jacobs & Ron Goldstock, Monitors & IPSIGS: Emergence of a 5ew Criminal Justice Role,
CRIM. L. BULL., (2007), at 217.

32

The Web site of the International Association of Independent Private Sector Inspectors General,
available at http://www.iaipsig.org.

33

James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779, 1787
(1976).

34

Id. at 1787.

35

Id. at 1787-88. Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188,
1200-01 (1975) [hereinafter Equitable Remedies].
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receiver to carry on a business in an entrepreneurial fashion.36 In addition, the presence of
a receiver often gave the company a poor reputation among its various stakeholders.37
Both factors harmed the ongoing business of the company.
In cases where a receivership was viewed as unnecessary but there were willful
violations of securities laws, SEC settlement decrees included the appointment of
independent directors (with or without a change in management),38 a “special counsel,”
or an “advisor.”39 The appointment of independent directors was a way to have the
benefits of a receivership, but limit the drawbacks associated with excessive negative
publicity and receivers’ obligations to act as officers of the court.40 Special counsel were
typically attorneys and they were given broad investigative and other powers.41 It was not
uncommon for special counsel to be used simultaneously with court-appointed
directors.42 The special counsel typically conducted an investigation and filed a report
with the SEC and the court,43 but in some cases they had the power to bring suits on
behalf of the shareholders based on their investigations.44 Advisors, on the other hand,
had no power to act independently of the board and were often experts who only
provided advice in specific areas (e.g., auditing). Corporations agreed to “special
counsels” or advisors because it was a more attractive option than the alternative of a
receivership.45 Associated with these agreements could be the requirement to adopt
certain practices and internal controls designed to prevent the future recurrence of the
securities violation at hand.46
This approach was popular with the SEC prior to 1984, when the agency had very
limited authority to impose civil penalties. Thus, the SEC relied on “remedial
undertakings such as procedural reforms and independent monitors, to enforce
compliance with the securities laws.”47 Although the SEC continued to use this approach

36

Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1201-2.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 1205. The court-appointed directors typically could not be voted out by the shareholders during a
specified time period and would only be liable to the shareholders for gross negligence. Id. at 1206.

39

Farrand, supra note 33, at 1793-94.

40

Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1206.

41

Farrand, supra note 33, at 1794.

42

Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1208.

43

Arthur F. Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunctive Actions,
31 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1329-30 (1975-76).

44

Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1208-9.

45

Farrand, supra note 33, at 1794-95; Mathews, supra note 43, at 1326 (1975-76). In other situations, the
SEC would ask the court to appoint an independent director. Id. at 1326-28.

46

Equitable Remedies, supra note 35, at 1196-99.

47

Stephen M. Cutler, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm., Address at
the 24th Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate & Securities Law Institute (April 29, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042904smc.htm.

8

to some degree,48 after 1984 monitorships received less attention until they enjoyed
renewed popularity in the post-Enron era, in parallel with their adoption by the DOJ.49
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General. Starting
in the 1990s, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General
began using Corporate Integrity Agreements (CIAs) as way to resolve claims related to
False Claims Act investigations (e.g., over-billing the government’s Medicare program).
What began as a loose copy of other self-disclosure programs (e.g., the Defense Industry
Initiative)50 is now a formalized process with corporations agreeing to over 500 CIAs in
the last few years.51 A CIA requires the corporation to implement improved internal
controls and a compliance program, appoint a compliance officer, conduct employee
training, and potentially fulfill other requirements as well.52 In addition, CIAs typically
require an Independent Review Organization (IRO) to evaluate the compliance program.
Companies compete for the IRO business. For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers claims
to have served as an IRO for more than 50 companies.53
Department of Justice (DOJ). In addition to DPAs, corporate monitorships have
been used as a term in a court-ordered probation after a criminal conviction or guilty plea.
Although the idea of probation for organizations had existed for some time, the 1991
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were the first governmental approval of probation
for rehabilitation purposes (previously, probation was limited to ensuring corporations
pay fines or restitution).54 Under the guidelines, courts were required to order probation if
48

For examples of cases where the SEC required an independent consultant to review a company’s
compliance policies and procedures, see, e.g., In the Matter of Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation,
Admin. Proceedings File No. 3-9535, 1998 SEC LEXIS 137 (Jan. 29, 1998); In the Matter of Smith Barney
Inc., Admin. Proceedings File No. 3-9426, 1997 SEC LEXIS 1973 (Sept. 23, 1997). In addition to the SEC,
the Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA) and its predecessor organizations—the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)—began making
more frequent use of monitorships starting in the early 1990s. Examples include settlements involving
Nikko Securities (1993 N.Y.S.E. WL 389168) and Nomura Securities (1995 N.Y.S.E. WL 705399).
49

See Cristie L. Ford, Toward a 5ew Model for Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN L. REV. 757, 797
(2005).

50

See infra notes 78 to 81 and accompanying text (describing the Defense Industry Initiative).

51

See Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General, Corporate Integrity
Agreements, available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.html. For a list of Corporate Integrity
Agreements and links to the texts of the agreements, see http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/index.html.

52

Id.

53

PwC Advisory Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Industry Group, How Can Pharmaceutical and Life
Sciences Companies Effectively Meet the Challenges of 5egotiating and Implementing a Corporate
Integrity
Agreement
(2008),
available
online
at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/industry.nsf/docid/D600B97CB2E4727780257221003B784A/$file/corporate
_integrity.pdf.
54

William S. Lofquist, Organizational Probation and the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 525 ANNALS OF
AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 157, 161 (1993); see also William S. Lofquist, Legislating
Organizational Probation: State Capacity, Business Power, and Corporate Crime Control, 27 LAW. &
SOC’Y. REV. 741, 749 (1993) (noting that the legislative history behind the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(which provided for corporate probation) indicated that Congress rejected probation terms that were
invasive and only approved noninvasive terms (e.g., fine collection and community service)).
THE

9

the organization had more than 50 employees and did not have a compliance program in
place.55 As part of a probation order, courts were allowed to require corporations to report
on the implementation of the program, and to have a special probation officer monitor
compliance based on a records review or employee interviews.56 After the 2004
amendments, the guidelines state that even if a corporation has a compliance program, a
court “shall” order a term of probation “if such sentence is necessary to ensure that
changes are made within the organization to reduce the likelihood of future criminal
conduct . . . .”57
Commentators’ early criticisms and endorsements of corporate probation mirror
the current debate about corporate monitorships. Critics questioned the ability of judges
to effectively implement and monitor the requirements in a probation order.58 With
respect to an early draft of the original sentencing guidelines, one commentator suggested
that Senate confirmation hearings on federal judges must now assess those judges’
abilities to run major corporations, since that was what the guidelines would now
require.59 Gruner, for example, argued instead for a probation system under which a
corporation proposed a compliance program to the court, which upon approval became
part of the probation terms, to be monitored by some form of probation officer.60 Gruner
argued that this approach had several advantages, including shifting the burden to
corporations, the ability to tailor the program to the corporation’s specific needs, greater
legitimacy of the program within the corporation because it was internally developed and
not externally imposed, encouraging innovation in compliance programs due to
involvement of corporation personnel, and general buy-in by executives.61 Gruner’s
arguments can easily be used to support the current use of corporate monitorships.
One example of a probation order that employed a monitor involved Consolidated
Edison (“Con Ed”). In 1994, Con Ed pled guilty to environmental law violations related
to the failure to disclose a potential asbestos leak to the public, and the judge sentenced
the company to the maximum fine and three years’ probation with a corporate monitor.62
55

Lofquist, Organizational Probation, supra note 54, at 162; Christopher A. Wray, Note: Corporate
Probation under the 5ew Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J. 2017, 2028 (1992).
56

Lofquist, Organizational Probation, supra note 54, at 162.

57

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1(a) (6). In addition, the company may be required to
develop an effective compliance and ethics program (§ 8D1.4(c)). The commentary states: “To assess the
efficacy of a compliance and ethics program submitted by the organization, the court may employ
appropriate experts who shall be afforded access to all material possessed by the organization that is
necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the proposed program.” If the organization repeatedly
violates the terms of probation, the sentencing guidelines specifically grant the court power to appoint a
special master or trustee to ensure compliance with the court orders (§ 8F1.1 (application note 1)).

58

Richard Gruner, To Let the Punishment Fit the Organization: Sanctioning Corporate Offenders through
Corporate Probation, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 73-74 (1988).

59

Wray, supra note 55, at 2018.

60

Gruner, supra note 58, at 83-84.

61

Id.

62

Michael B. Gerrard & Deborah Goldberg, Corporate Probation: The Con Edison Sentence, N.Y. L.J.
(May 26, 1995), at 3. Con Ed pled guilty to violating the Emergency Planning and Community Right-toKnow Act of 1986 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act by
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In sentencing the corporation, the judge specifically stated that Con Ed had a culture that
discouraged reporting bad news, and that culture intimidated people who otherwise
would have reported the presence of asbestos from making such a report.63 The monitor
was charged with ensuring that Con Ed was adopting and implementing an effective
compliance program.64 An initial report by the monitor stated that several months into the
monitorship, Con Ed continued to use intimidation to prevent employees from reporting
violations.65 The monitor also stated that even if the corporation sincerely attempted to
implement its new proposed control system, it would have no effect unless the
corporation also worked to reform its “insular” and “destructive” corporate culture.66 At
the end of the three-year probation, however, the Judge stated that Con Ed had made
significant improvements in implementing a compliance program and the company
credited the change to the guidance of the monitor.67 The monitor, however, had
expressed some reservations just a few months before the probation ended, stating in a
report that “[m]anagers a rung or two below the officer level have expressed a fear of
speaking up. Many employees said their fears will intensify once the probation ends.”68
He turned out to be correct since, just a few months after the monitorship ended, the
company again failed to notify the public in a timely manner of potential harm due to
toxic chemicals,69 and was later placed under the supervision of another monitor.70
III.

History & Evolution of Corporate Ethics and Compliance Programs

This brief historical overview suggests that ultimately, monitorships are attempts
to ensure that the organization has policies and procedures in place that will help prevent
future misconduct. For corporations, those policies and procedures make up the
failing to notify the public of the release of asbestos in a steam pipe explosion. Id. The Sentencing
Guidelines’ did not apply to this case because the incidents occurred in 1989, which was before the
effective date of the 1991 Sentencing Guidelines.
63

Id. The judge stated “One of the things I found disturbing here was the sense that there were people at
Con Edison, who testified at the trial, who clearly knew and who should have been jumping up and down
saying, there is asbestos here, we know it. It was obvious they didn't say it because they were intimidated
from saying it, because they didn't think that was the corporate culture. . .I do think there was a sense here,
at certain levels within this company, that you had better not tell the bad news.”

64

Id.

65

Don van Natta Jr., Con Ed Cited in Intimidation of Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1995, at B1.

66

Id.

67

David W. Dunlap, Memories of the '89 Blast Linger in Gramercy Park, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at B4.

68

Russell Mokhiber, Reddy Kilowatt: On Probation, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Oct. 1997, at 7, 8.

69

David M. Herszenhorn, Con Edison Taken to Task Over PCBs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1998, at 45 (noting
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organization’s ethics and compliance programs. The formalization of compliance
programs and the development of compliance professionals evolved over a period of
several decades, and today’s programs are characterized by an integrated and multifactorial approach to corporate compliance. This evolution is important because, as
discussed in Parts IV and V below, corporate monitorships often seem to be operating on
an older view of compliance—one that is focused on technical compliance as opposed to
a more holistic, organizational culture-based approach.
A.
A Brief History of Compliance Programs: From Controls to Corporate
Culture
An early influence in the development and adoption of compliance programs were
the antitrust criminal prosecutions in the heavy electrical equipment industry in the
1960s.71 During one prosecution, General Electric attempted to use its compliance
program as a defense against the criminal charges.72 Although General Electric was
unsuccessful, that attempt spurred widespread adoption of antitrust compliance programs.
Eventually, regulators indicated they would take adoption of such programs into account
when attempting to determine if a violation was “inadvertent” as opposed to intentional.73
A second major catalyst for the development and adoption of compliance
programs was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA).74 In addition to
prohibiting corporations from making corrupt payments to government officials,75 the
FCPA requires corporations to implement accounting practices and internal controls that
are designed to ensure that the company is not making corrupt payments.76 This spurred
widespread adoption of codes of conduct and compliance programs by multinational
corporations.77
Third, in the 1980s,78 due to concerns about corruption in the defense industry,
and based on the recommendations of a commission appointed by the President, the
Defense Industry Initiative (DII) was created.79 The DII was an attempt at self-regulation
that encouraged defense contractors to adopt a code of ethics, provide training on the
71
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code to all employees, and to create a “free and open atmosphere” within the organization
for employees to report instances of fraud.80 Participation in the DII was voluntary, but
the Department of Defense encouraged participation by indicating that it would consider
a corporation’s compliance program as a mitigating factor in any debarment decisions.81
To receive preferential treatment, corporations were expected to self-disclose the
violation and cooperate with the Department of Defense in its investigation.82
Finally, the most important influence occurred in 1991 when the United States
Sentencing Commission followed the lead of the DII and amended the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to provide a mitigated sentence for corporations convicted of a
crime if they were able to demonstrate that they had attempted to prevent the misconduct
by having an “effective” compliance program in place.83 The Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines established seven basic requirements for an effective program, including the
adoption of standards and procedures to prevent criminal conduct, appropriate oversight
of the program by high-level personnel, communication of the requirements to all
employees, and monitoring and updating the program as needed.84
The Guidelines pushed compliance programs out of the defense industry, beyond
limited issues such as antitrust and the FCPA, and into the mainstream.85 This spurred the
significantly increased use of Ethics and Compliance Officers, industry associations to
support the work of compliance professionals, and education programs put on by such
groups as the Practicing Law Institute.86 The adoption of compliance programs consistent
with the Guidelines continued to grow when in 1996, in the case of In re Caremark, the
Delaware Supreme Court indicated that directors’ fiduciary duties may require the board
to take advantage of the potential for a mitigated sentence under the Guidelines by
adopting a compliance program.87 Further incentives to adopt and improve compliance
programs came in 1999, when the DOJ officially stated that it would take into account the
adequacy of a corporation’s compliance program when deciding whether to prosecute a
corporation, as opposed to just prosecuting any individuals involved in the criminal
80
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activity.88 Likewise, in 2001, the SEC issued what is commonly known as the Seaboard
Report, which indicated that it would be more lenient in its enforcement response for
corporations that had effective compliance programs in place and cooperated with the
SEC in its investigation.89
During this time, academics and industry professionals worked at developing a
better understanding of what makes a compliance program effective. One of the most
influential insights was Harvard Business School Professor Lynn Sharp Paine's
distinction between compliance-based programs and integrity-based programs.90 Both
applied to compliance programs, but Paine referred to a compliance-based approach as
focusing primarily on deterrence through punishment for rule violations, while an
integrity-based program focused on developing appropriate organizational values and
empowering employees to act upon those values.91 Empirical studies show that the most
88
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effective compliance programs have elements of each approach, but that the integritybased aspects must dominate.92
Implementing an integrity-based program requires understanding the
organization’s culture.93 The importance of managing an organization’s culture to ensure
the effectiveness of a compliance program gained significant traction when the
Sentencing Commission formalized it as part of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines in 2004. The amended Guidelines refer to a corporation’s “compliance and
ethics program” and describe an effective program as one designed to “prevent and detect
criminal conduct” and to “promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”94
B.

The Development of Compliance Professionals

The increased importance of compliance programs is leading to the development
of compliance professionals. This development is supported by several nonprofit
organizations and networks devoted to compliance professionals.95 The Society of
Corporate Compliance and Ethics has recently started offering a one-day exam (and
associated training programs) that allow an individual to become a certified compliance
and ethics professional.96 Some universities are also starting to offer certificate programs
in compliance.97
Despite the development of a compliance profession, there remains wide variation
in corporations’ general approach to their compliance programs. For example, there is no
uniformity when it comes to whom the organization selects to be in charge of the
compliance program. A recent survey found that the person with responsibility for the
compliance program had the word “compliance” in their title (e.g., Chief Compliance
Officer) in only forty percent of the companies that responded. 98 Others executives in

compliance-based program focuses on teaching employees the laws and rules they must comply with, an
integrity-based program focuses on integrating ethics into employees' decision making and inspiring them
to live up to the company's ethical ideals.”).
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charge of the compliance program include someone in the General Counsel’s office, the
controller, or a vice president of internal audit.99 Accordingly, the background of the
person in charge of the compliance program can also vary. A 2000 survey found that only
twenty-nine percent of compliance officers in the United States had a law degree.100 This
reflects the evolution of the role, which seems to be moving away from being viewed as a
field for simply “legal technicians.”101 The approach to managing a compliance program
can vary significantly between CECOs who are lawyers by training and CECOs who
come from a management background. For example, one survey found that legally
trained CECOs believed that the most important root causes of misconduct were
employee ignorance of legal requirements and corporate policies.102 Those from a
management background, however, listed the most important causes as factors related to
a corporation’s culture, such as lack of leadership on ethics and management pressure to
meet goals and performance expectations.103
The individuals in charge of compliance programs typically report directly to the
CEO or general counsel, but a smaller percentage report to the Chief Financial Officer or
the audit committee of the board of directors.104 Even though the individual in charge of
the compliance program does not report directly to the board, under the Sentencing
Guidelines, they should have access to the board if needed,105 and it appears that most
do.106 Some, however, argue that this is not sufficient and that the board should have
direct control over the compliance officer (e.g., hiring, compensating, terminating).107
The respondents were from corporations of a wide range of sizes and industries. The raw data is on file
with the authors.
99
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These commentators argue that this is necessary because ethics and compliance officers
“do not have sufficient power, status [or] authority”108 to do their jobs appropriately,
which is further harmed by an inherent conflict of interest resulting from the compliance
officer being accountable only to top management.109 For example, one former chief
compliance officer stated, “[a]s a chief compliance officer, the stances you have to take
are sometimes in opposition to the direction the company may otherwise be inclined to
go. That requires lots of intestinal fortitude.”110 Others in the field claim that compliance
officers have been forced out of their jobs when they refused orders from top
management to stop an investigation, for example.111 Complaints that compliance officers
face pressures to not start an investigation or to close it before completion appear to be
fairly common.112
C.

Summary of Monitorships and Compliance Programs

Over the last few decades there has been tremendous growth in the importance of
corporate compliance and ethics programs in criminal and civil liability. Although
compliance programs started out focused on specific issues, best practices now suggest
that a single program should encompass the near entirety of a firm’s efforts at compliance
with laws and regulations.113 This development has not been without controversy,
however. Critics argue that corporations use compliance programs as “window dressing”
to create merely the appearance of a commitment to compliance, which may still provide
the corporation the benefits of a mitigated sentence if the need arises.114 These are “paper
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programs,” where corporations adopt policies and procedures on paper but do not embed
them into their actual operations.115 In response, and in recognition of the value of an
integrity-based approach,116 current thinking now expects compliance programs to
consider an organization’s culture as well, and enforcement agents look for evidence of a
“compliance attitude” in corporations.117
During the same time period, monitorships appeared in a variety of corporate and
non-corporate settings. The overarching goal of a monitorship is to ensure that the
organization in question has been “reformed,” so that it would exhibit better legal
compliance in the future. Thus, whether the monitor takes significant control over the
organization or simply audits the changes management made, the goal is to improve the
compliance program (using the term broadly) of the organization. However, as fully
described in the next Part, monitorships in practice do not seem to be keeping up with the
evolution of the compliance profession. This is in large part explained by the background
of the monitor selected. Perhaps drawing from the experience of trustees in the union
RICO suits, monitors are primarily former prosecutors and attorneys with similar
training, who may not have the right skills and approach for the task at hand.118
Exacerbating the problem are additional factors, which were also behind the inconsistent
success rate of trustees in union RICO suits,119 such as lack of information sharing
between monitors and the failure of the government to conduct systematic performance
evaluations for the purpose of improving future monitorships.120 The SEC, which started
on a different monitorship trajectory, now appears to be developing practices consistent
with the DOJ, and in fact often conducts joint monitorships with the DOJ. The next Part
explains the path down which the DOJ and SEC monitorships now seem to be going.
Following this path was not necessarily a conscious choice, but a result of various
decisions along the way that create a significant gap between the potential of
monitorships in theory and monitorships in practice.
IV.

Understanding Corporate Monitorships

Breaking monitorships down into a process involving a series of discrete decision
stages helps us to think about how they function in practice. The first stage in the process
is negotiating the terms of the monitorship, which also includes the decision by the
government to agree to a settlement. During this process, the parties determine whether
or not a monitor is required and, if so, the duties and powers of the monitor. Second, the
parties select the monitor through the process defined in the agreement. Third, the
monitor begins his work, including developing a work plan, analyzing the needs of the
organization, overseeing the implementation of a compliance program, and evaluating the
115
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effectiveness of that program. Finally, the monitorship comes to an end with a
determination by the monitor and the government that the company has satisfactorily
completed the terms of the agreement.
Decisions by the parties at each stage in this process have a significant impact on
the subsequent stages and ultimately determine whether or not the monitorship is
successful in terms of improving corporate compliance and preventing future violations
of law. In order to better see these relationships, this Part presents our analysis of the
interview data through the stages of this process. This analysis is based principally on
interviews with individuals directly involved in the monitorship process. To collect our
primary data, we conducted 20 telephone interviews in the summer of 2008. Almost half
of our interviews were with individuals who have served as corporate monitors for the
DOJ and/or the SEC. The rest of the interviews were with monitors in some of the noncorporate contexts described above, compliance consultants, and regulators in both the
United States and Canada. We spoke with interviewees not only about their direct
experience, but also their broader views on monitorships, and those broader views are
also reflected here. Our secondary data includes public statements made by monitors,
compliance officers at companies that underwent a monitorship, public officials, and
attorneys involved in the negotiation of settlement agreements.121 Our analysis also
includes a review of the settlement agreements and the few cases in which monitorship
reports were made publicly available.122
Our study is limited by the fact that we were only able to speak to a subset of
monitors and regulators, and not to any corporate officials directly involved in a
monitorship. 123 Although these monitors and regulators described a range of different
experiences in many ways, our findings could still be unrepresentative if those choosing
to participate in our study had significantly different experiences from those that chose
not to participate. We have also put aside some important differences between the civil
and criminal contexts in order to keep the scope of this paper focused on monitorships as
a whole. While this limits the specificity of our findings, it allows us to focus on
significant and otherwise underappreciated commonalities between these models. Even
with these limitations, however, we believe our insights and points of caution are
instructive for the use of corporate monitorships in all situations. These findings point to
potential problems that should be monitored by any government agency that uses
monitorships, and should be further investigated and tested by future researchers.
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A.

"egotiating the Terms of the Settlement Agreement

The settlement agreement establishes the terms of the monitorship. The monitors
we interviewed all placed great importance on conducting their monitorships within the
bounds of the agreement. Thus, clearly defining the goals of the monitorship and
establishing the duties of the monitor are highly important for ensuring that the
monitorship is successful and that success can ultimately be determined by some
objective standard. Although flexibility in the implementation of monitorships is one of
their virtues as a policy tool, there is a difference between flexibility—which can be
carefully designed—and vagueness, which is a failure to specify key components or
terms. If the terms of the monitorship are too vague, different monitors may interpret
similar terms quite differently based on their background and approach to monitorships.
In this section, we first look at the foundational issue of why the government might enter
into settlement agreements. The policy goals behind that decision should be reflected in
the stated goals of the monitorship agreement. In this section we also discuss the factors
that go into decisions about the duties and independence of the monitor.
1.

Settle or Prosecute? Policy Debates Behind Settlement Agreements

In the criminal context, the first decision a prosecutor must make is whether to
indict the corporation, agree to a settlement (with or without a monitor), or prosecute only
individuals and not seek punishment for the corporation. Of course, there will be times
when imposing sanctions on genuinely “bad apple” individuals is all that is needed. The
SEC’s Framework for Cooperation and the McNulty Memo factors also suggest that there
may be times when a corporation’s cooperation is so complete that no enforcement action
needs to be taken, even where a violation existed. The recent increase in the use of
settlement agreements has not been without controversy, and also has reinvigorated the
familiar debate about whether a corporation should be held criminally liable for the
actions of its employees in any circumstance.124
This paper’s specific concern is whether, assuming that some action against a
corporation is called for, settlement agreements with monitorships provide sufficient
benefits to justify their use. As stated earlier, some view these settlement agreements as a
“stroke of genius,” as the “government is able to get everything out of a deferred
prosecution agreement that it can get out of an actual trial.”125 The government can save
the costs of an investigation and trial by having the corporation admit wrongdoing (for
DOJ settlements, but usually not for SEC settlements). In addition, the corporation agrees
to terms that are equivalent to corporate probation.126 While some celebrate this trend,
some of our interviewees worried about the “sword of Damocles” that hangs over the
corporation’s head in the criminal context, even when the company enters into a DPA.
124
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On the other side of the debate, some argue that these settlements are letting corporations
escape accountability127 and perhaps even encouraging corporations to engage in riskier
behavior and push the limits of the law.128
Not all cases are appropriate for settlement agreements with monitorships.129 One
civil-side regulator interviewee told us that only a small portion of the enforcement cases
it pursues every year result in monitorships. Trying to determine the cases that are
appropriate is the challenge faced by prosecutors and other government regulators. On
the criminal side, the McNulty Memo provides guidance on the factors prosecutors
should consider when conducting an investigation and deciding whether to charge a
corporation.130 With respect to non-prosecution agreements, the Memo only specifically
mentions the factor of voluntary cooperation.131 However, the factors related to the
prosecution decision clearly impact the settlement decision as well. On that front, the
Memo identifies key factors such as “the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing” and the
“corporation's history of similar conduct.”132 The Memo does not tell the prosecutor how
to weigh those different factors against each other, though it does state that in some cases
one factor, such as the nature and seriousness of the offense, may “warrant prosecution
regardless of the other factors.”133
For some of the regulators we interviewed, the presence of these factors related to
widespread wrongdoing within the organization were what made a case appropriate for a
monitorship. For example, one regulator stated that monitorships were most appropriate
where:
[An organization] has engaged in violative conduct. That violative
conduct has not been corrected, or we don’t have enough assurance that
it’s been corrected, so the conduct or the problem might be ongoing. . . .
The source of the problem is at the firm level, it’s not just an isolated bad
apple.
Thus, although many monitorships involve cases of intentional wrongdoing for
which individuals, including senior corporate officers, are often sanctioned, it is
important to recognize that individual wrongdoing is often difficult to separate from
organizational wrongdoing. Likewise, it is difficult to conceive of many situations that
call for a monitorship, but for no individual responsibility. At some point, however, the
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organization must be deemed too rotten to be entitled to a DPA monitorship and must
face prosecution. As one regulator interviewee suggested:
If we came to the conclusion that they were rotten to the core, you
need to indict. That’s still the correct result for the worst of the worst.
Monitors for those middle cases persuade prosecutors that there have
been lapses but that they are committed to rectifying these wrongs,
including terminating responsible people and instituting new control
mechanisms.
These comments are basically consistent with our prior arguments that “worst
actor” (but not utterly corrupt) corporations are those whose conduct was most
appropriate for a monitorship.134 For those who would argue that corporations with
widespread wrongdoing cannot be reformed and therefore indictment is necessary, some
of the union trusteeships may suggest that even deeply corrupt organizations can be
reformed through monitorships (bearing in mind that the scope of the successful union
trusteeships seems to be beyond the intended scope of most current corporate
monitorships).135 The challenge facing prosecutors is identifying appropriate cases for
monitorships. The prosecutor must be able to distinguish between truly egregious conduct
that calls for prosecution; those “middle cases” where the conduct was sufficiently
wrongful and pervasive to justify the costs and intrusions of a monitor; and the lesser
cases where such costs are not justified.
Another factor from the McNulty Memo that may outweigh the others and tip the
scales in favor of a settlement relates to “collateral consequences,” or harm to the
stakeholders of the corporation.136 The fall of Arthur Andersen is regularly cited as a
spectacularly bad outcome that demonstrates the need for settlement agreements to
protect innocent employees and shareholders and to keep viable business entities
functioning.137 Siemens is a corporation that could potentially benefit from this
reasoning.138 Siemens, a German company that is also listed on the New York Stock
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Exchange,139 appears to have engaged in egregious violations of the FCPA; and such
corrupt payments seem to have been deeply ingrained into that organization’s business
practices.140 One compliance consultant we interviewed suggested that Siemens would be
the “perfect case” for a monitorship on the basis that, even though this was clearly an
organization that needed significant help in reforming itself, an indictment that forced it
out of business would have a tremendous and negative impact. In spite of the importance
of this factor, however, it is clear that concerns about collateral consequences are not the
only rationale behind monitorships.141 Indeed, monitorships are regularly imposed on
midsize corporations and firms, and there is precedent for imposing a monitorship on
small, family owned businesses as well.142 The government’s reasons for imposing a
monitorship on a small firm – including one with a tight relationship between ownership
and control – could be many: the cost of litigation and the possibility that litigation might
fail, the hope that more concentrated oversight and education could help the firm become
compliant, or simply the desire not to destroy the firm if other options are still
available.143
If any overarching generalization is possible about what cases are appropriate for
settlement agreements involving monitorships, it would be that some sort of balancing
test is called for. The misconduct in question should have a systemic, organization-wide
component, but the misconduct cannot be so pervasive that the corporation or firm is an
Combined Criminal Fines, Dec. 15, 2008, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08crm-1105.html
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utterly criminal organization. Problems should be serious enough to justify the cost of a
monitorship, but the corporation or firm cannot be irredeemable. The subject firm or
corporation can be “too big to fail,” or small enough to learn and reform itself, or
somewhere in between. Because monitorships can be a viable option in such a range of
situations, they can become a convenient middle-of-the-road choice (or non-choice) for a
prosecutor. In fact, one monitor we interviewed thought that monitorships were becoming
a “fall back position” for prosecutors. That is, monitorships are being imposed on
corporations without clear thought by the prosecutor as to whether or not they are
appropriate for the case at hand. The perception that monitorships are being used in a
“one size fits all” manner may adversely affect their perceived legitimacy and therefore
their chances of long-term success.
2.

Power and Participation in the 5egotiation Process

Once the government has decided to enter a settlement agreement, the parties
must negotiate the exact terms of the agreement.144 Many have noted that prosecutors
have significant power over corporations in this context. The government has a
bargaining advantage because it has the option of pursuing criminal charges, and a
criminal conviction can have a significant negative effect on a company (some even refer
to it as a “death sentence”).145 In addition, if an executive has already pled guilty, then the
corporation knows it has little to no defense.146 Some argue that prosecutors have abused
this power. Professor Epstein goes so far as to argue that “DPAs no longer serve the
public interest. The agreements often read like the confessions of a Stalinist purge trial, as
battered corporations recant their past sins and submit to punishments wildly in excess of
any underlying offense.”147 Complaints receiving significant media attention include
settlement terms not directly related to the underlying offense148 and conflicts of interest
within the DOJ relating to the monitor selection process.149 In response, there have been
calls for greater legislative and court control over monitorships.150
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This public criticism has created some changes that attempt to restrict US
Attorneys’ discretion. In May 2008, the DOJ issued guidelines that prohibit a settlement
agreement from requiring a corporation to make payments to any organization that was
not a victim of the criminal activity.151 In March 2008, the DOJ issued guidelines for the
selection of monitors.152 To reduce the potential for conflicts of interest in the selection of
the monitor, the guidelines require the use of committees to make selection decisions, and
require final approval by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General.153
Although public criticism has affected some aspects of monitorship negotiations,
what has not changed are the parties at the negotiating table. Noticeably absent are any
parties other than the government and the corporation, including investors, employees, or
community representatives.154 Khanna and Dickinson observe that corporate
monitorships share features with proposals by others that would require corporations to
include on their boards professional, independent directors elected by institutional
investors.155 This suggests that the shareholders of the corporation may have an interest in
having a say in the terms of the agreement or the selection of the monitor.156 One
corporate defense attorney and former prosecutor stated, “I think part of the frustration of
people who question the government’s use of deferred prosecution agreements is that the
process does not include parties that may take a contrary view.”157 Also frustrating to
these other parties is the fact that an unknown number of deferred and non-prosecution
agreements are not made public. This prevents these stakeholders from having a more
complete understanding of how the DOJ is handling corporate crime.
Only one of our interviewees told us that the prosecutors negotiating the terms of
the monitorship had considered involving a major shareholder in the process. The
decision was ultimately made not to involve that shareholder, apparently out of concerns
that the shareholder was more interested in finding fault than reforming the corporation.
(2008) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h6492; and H.R. 5086, 110th Cong.
(2008), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c110:1:./temp/~c110fksIK0::.
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The concern mirrors a parallel concern discussed further below158 about making
monitors’ final reports to the US Attorney available to the public. In both situations, the
advantages of opening the process to a wider group of stakeholders may be outweighed
by the potential chilling effect on the corporation’s complete participation in the
negotiations and the monitorship process.
Overall, there is considerable inequality of bargaining power at the negotiating
table. Not only do corporations not have a better alternative to settlement that would give
them a credible threat of leaving the negotiation table, but corporations may even be
afraid to push back against government demands for fear of being perceived as not
genuinely contrite or willing to correct their problems. While many corporations surely
enter into monitorships with a sincere desire to fix problems and regain their ethical
footing, their immediate goal is to mitigate: to resolve the matter without a criminal
indictment and at the least possible cost.
3.

Corporate Rehabilitation & the Duties of Corporate Monitors

By contrast to the corporation’s immediate goal, the government’s priorities may
be wide-ranging, and can include providing appropriate restitution where necessary,
administering a level of deterrence that is deemed appropriate in the circumstances, and
putting the corporation on the path to reform. The 2006 McNulty Memo states that the
decision of whether to prosecute a company or settle should ensure that the goals of
criminal law—including punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation—are sufficiently
satisfied.159 The 2008 Morford Memo states that monitorships should not be used “to
further punitive goals.”160 Taken together, this means that monitorships can serve as a
reform measure and as a deterrent. As discussed earlier, several commentators challenge
the idea that monitorships are effective specific or general deterrents. One compliance
consultant we interviewed, however, suggested that monitorships could be a truly “scary
deterrent” because, although shareholders may not be too concerned with fines, the
presence of a monitor can create a troubling level of uncertainty that lasts throughout the
monitorship. Many of our interviewees also observed that “nobody wants a monitor,”
effectively because of the disruption they represent to business operations.
In this paper, our primary concern is with the potential for corporate rehabilitation
under a monitorship. The desire to spur meaningful reform is implicated at every stage of
the settlement process. The factors behind a prosecutor’s decision to enter into a
settlement agreement reflect the same concerns, and also should have an impact on the
terms of the settlement agreement and the scope of the monitorship.
A key factor in the settlement determination under the McNulty Memo is the “the
existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program.”161 In at least one case,
the government has turned to compliance consultants to help evaluate this factor. The US
Attorney in Western Pennsylvania hired Compliance Systems Legal Group to investigate
Mellon Bank’s compliance program as part of the US Attorney’s consideration of the
158

See infra Part IV.C.4.

159

McNulty Memo, supra note 88, at 5.

160

Morford Memo, supra note 152, at 2

161

McNulty Memo, supra note 88, at 4.

26

McNulty Memo factors.162 Although Mellon Bank avoided criminal prosecution for the
destruction of tax documents, its compliance program was found to be deficient, and its
settlement agreement required the company to improve its compliance and ethics
program and pay for a monitor to oversee the implementation of the program.163 In a
different case, prosecutors found a clearly inadequate compliance program. Faro
Technologies, which admitted in its settlement agreement to violating the FCPA, did not
even address issues related to the FCPA in its compliance program or training even
though it regularly conducted business in China, which put it at high risk for making
corrupt payments.164 In both cases, the settlement agreement addressed these compliance
program inadequacies and required improvement.
In addition to the compliance program, prosecutors are also instructed to consider
a “company’s compliance attitude”165 or, in other words, the corporation’s culture. The
McNulty Memo requires prosecutors to look for a “corporate culture that encouraged, or
at least condoned, such conduct, regardless of any compliance programs.” Likewise, in
securities enforcement, the Seaboard Report tells enforcement lawyers to ask, “How did
the misconduct arise? Is it the result of pressure placed on employees to achieve specific
results, or a tone of lawlessness set by those in control of the company?”166 Through
these enquiries, the government is trying to determine if the wrongful acts were
committed by a small group of rogue employees (“bad apples”) who went against the
grain of the rest of the corporation, or if corporate leadership had created a culture that
rewarded and encouraged the wrongful acts in spite of having a compliance program that
purported to prohibit such behavior (a “bad barrel”). If the investigation shows that a root
cause of the problem is a “bad barrel,” then any settlement agreement sought by
prosecutors should seek to address that problem. Accordingly, a monitor’s duties should
typically serve those ends.
Focusing specifically on the DOJ, according to the recent Morford Memo,
monitorships are typically used to ensure the company has “effectively implemented
ethics and compliance programs to address and reduce the risk of recurrence of the
corporation’s misconduct.”167 Most monitorships in place as of the publication of the
Morford Memo in March 2008 are consistent with the guidelines set out in that memo.
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The large majority of the monitors are charged with ensuring compliance with the
settlement agreement, reviewing the compliance program related to the offence,
recommending changes to existing compliance processes, and then reviewing the
effectiveness of the implementation of those changes. In addition, in slightly under half
the agreements, the monitor is charged with monitoring the company’s compliance with
applicable federal laws. Interestingly, however, almost without exception, McNulty
Memo-style language about a corporation’s compliance “attitude” or “culture” does not
appear in the agreements.
In the nine months since the Morford Memo, as of this writing, three additional
monitorships have been imposed on companies through settlement agreements with the
DOJ for violations of the FCPA. All three cases were handled by the DOJ’s Fraud
Section and they use almost identical language for establishing the procedure for the
selecting the monitor and the duties of the monitor. With respect to compliance programs,
the monitors are required to oversee the implementation of a compliance program, ensure
that the program is “appropriately designed,” and conduct annual follow-up reviews of
the program.168 The agreements also state that the monitor should take “such steps as are
necessary to develop an understanding of the facts and circumstances surrounding any
violation that may have occurred.”169 That broad language allows for significant
interpretation, which may or may not include matters related to a corporation’s culture.
However, two of these agreements qualify that language in that they specifically state that
the monitors should not conduct their own investigations into past FCPA violations at
these companies (and therefore may have to rely only on information provided to them by
the corporation).170 There is no indication why these monitorships, (all agreed to within a
few weeks of each other) were treated differently. 171
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Although the agreements (either pre- or post-Morford) do not address the issue of
corporate culture in so many words, in some cases the government appears to view
certain negotiated terms as addressing those issues. For example, in Bristol-Myers
Squibb’s DPA, the US Attorney who negotiated the agreement specifically stated that
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s culture “greatly contributed to the criminal conduct.”172
Employees in the company regularly used fraudulent means to hit aggressive sales and
earnings targets between 2000 and 2001.173 The company engaged in similar conduct in
the early 1990s and implemented controls to reduce that behavior, but corporate culture
overrode those controls and the wrongful behavior reached new heights.174 In an attempt
to correct these cultural problems, the US Attorney did not specifically charge the
monitor with investigating the culture issues and making recommendations—though the
monitor did have the power to “to take any steps he believes are necessary to comply
with the terms of this Agreement” – but included certain structural reforms in the DPA.
For example, the DPA required quarterly meetings between senior managers and the
independent auditors, to help foster a culture of disclosure.175 In addition, the DPA
required the CEO and CFO to make certain reports on transactions to the board, the
monitor, and the company’s Chief Compliance Officer.176 Finally, the DPA required the
company to implement a training program.177 In explaining the need for these
requirements, the US Attorney who negotiated the DPA stated: “Many of the remedial
measures in the deferred prosecution agreement—the top-level structural and governance
changes, the reporting by senior management, and the training and education programs
for key financial and legal personnel—are designed to spread knowledge and
responsibility for doing the right thing throughout the Bristol-Myers organization.”178
These kinds of comments demonstrate a desire on the part of the US Attorney to
change the organization’s culture. Leaving aside, for now, questions about whether these
negotiated terms are sufficient on their own to effect positive change to corporate ethical
culture, the initial problem is that although the monitor is charged with overseeing the
implementation and effectiveness of required compliance measures, the monitor’s exact
role in this process is unclear.179 The terms of the agreement could allow the monitor to
172
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take on only an auditor role and simply check what the company has done, or the monitor
could become a team member pushing and assisting with cultural change.180
4.

The Scope of the Monitorship

Along with variation in the duties of the monitor, there has been variation in the
scope of monitorships. These issues are clearly intertwined with the duties of the monitor
discussed in the previous section, but in this section we try to add some clarity to the
variations—both intentional and unintentional—around what role the monitor is expected
to play.
The Morford Memo recognizes that the monitor’s role must be appropriately
designed and states:
Neither the corporation nor the public benefits from employing a
monitor whose role is too narrowly defined (and, therefore, prevents the
monitor from effectively evaluating the reforms intended by the parties) or
too broadly defined (and, therefore, results in the monitor engaging in
activities that fail to facilitate the corporation's implementation of the
reforms intended by the parties).181
The monitor’s role should vary based on the circumstances and should be
designed to allow the monitor to carry out her duties appropriately, without being overly
intrusive. Based on the settlement agreements (including SEC agreements), we place the
monitorships along a spectrum using four general categories, which from smallest scope
to largest scope are: Advisor, Auditor, Associate, and Autocrat.
In its most modest version, the monitor may simply serve an Advisor role. For
example, although the DOJ listed Aaron Marcu as a monitor for Aurora Foods in its letter
to the House Judiciary Committee,182 the settlement agreement appears to give the
monitor very limited powers. According to the agreement, the monitor is referred to as an
“outside consultant” that is to be hired “to advise Aurora regarding an appropriate
compliance program.”183 The company is also required to “implement the
recommendations made by that outside consultant.”184 The agreement further specifies
that certain individuals must oversee the implementation of the compliance program,
and the government, or of any other particular documents that might govern the situation, so the
corporation-monitor contract would be the logical place for any additional detail. The monitor contract in
the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey was made publicly available. If this contract is
representative of other corporation-monitor contracts, then these contracts do not provide additional
clarification on these expectations as the document simply refers back to the DPA for the scope and terms
of the monitor’s duties and powers. Also, the monitors we interviewed mentioned their settlement
agreements for setting out their duties and not their contract with the company, which suggests that it is not
important and it is the work plan that matters.
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including an individual appointed as a compliance officer and a newly appointed
independent director to serve on the audit committee.185
At the other extreme—the Autocrat—monitors are given significant powers. The
primary example is the appointment of Richard Breeden as the monitor for WorldCom
following an SEC request for ancillary relief from the court. Initially, Mr. Breeden was
appointed to ensure that the company did not destroy evidence, and to review
compensation payments to ensure the company was not using excessive officer
compensation as a form of “looting.”186 In a later consent decree, the monitor’s powers
were expanded to include reviewing and making recommendations on the company’s
entire corporate governance structure, including its compliance program.187 This resulted
in Mr. Breeden issuing a 147-page report that included far-reaching recommendations on
such controversial matters as shareholder nomination of directors, and a ban on the use of
stock options for compensating corporate officers.188 Mr. Breeden also played a role in
selecting and removing certain members of the board of directors, and determining to
which potential acquirer the company should be sold.189
Another example is the DPA for the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New
Jersey (UMDNJ). In that agreement, the monitor had full access to all documents and
information held by UMDNJ and at the monitor’s “discretion” could investigate any
allegation of wrongdoing.190 In addition to reviewing and making recommendations on
UMDNJ’s compliance program, the monitor had the “authority to require UMDNJ to
take any steps he or she believes are necessary for UMDNJ to comply with the terms of
this agreement” and was required to “ensure UMDNJ’s compliance with applicable
federal and state laws.”191 During the course of the monitorship, the monitor, Herbert J.
Stern, a former federal prosecutor and judge, filed reports alleging wrongdoing by
various doctors and a dean, which led to employment terminations.192 The monitor
employed various law and auditing firms to assist in his work, and after six months on the
job submitted a bill for $5.8 million, which drew criticism because that figure was higher
than the amount that UMDNJ had allegedly overbilled Medicaid.193
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In the middle are the Auditor and Associate roles. The Auditor assumes a role of
assuring the DOJ that the corporation is doing what it says it is doing in terms of
implementing internal controls and a new compliance program. The Auditor also may
make recommendations for improvements where necessary. The Associate, on the other
hand, conducts the work of an Auditor, but also functions more fully as a partner with the
compliance officer, board of directors, or other relevant corporate officials. For each of
these roles, the settlement agreement typically states that the monitor will evaluate the
company’s compliance with the settlement agreement, review the company’s compliance
program and make recommendations for improvement, oversee implementation of the
recommended changes, conduct follow-up evaluations of the compliance program (e.g.,
annually for the next two years), and file reports with the company and the DOJ on the
company’s progress.194 As discussed below, the monitor’s adoption of either the Auditor
or Associate role has less to do with the written terms of the agreement, and more with
the monitor’s chosen approach.195
5.

Monitor Independence

Although the Morford Memo states that a monitor is “by definition” independent
of the company and the government,196 sometimes the decision is made that a fully
independent monitor is not necessary. Our research indicates that both civil and criminalside regulators are willing to consider monitorship structures of varying degrees of
independence, depending on the perceived needs of the case,197 with less independent
monitors typically serving an “advising” role.198 One civil-side regulator we spoke with
described a spectrum, with certification by a firm’s in-house counsel or internal audit
department on one end, review by a firm’s outside counsel in the middle of the spectrum,
and a fully independent review by a third party at the far end. According to this regulator,
certifications or internal compliance audits are generally considered to be adequate where
the conduct in question is less serious and/or the review can be fairly easily verified on
objective bases.
Where the conduct is especially serious, the judgments required are subjective,
and the regulator is not satisfied with the steps the firm has taken so far, the regulator is
more likely to insist on retaining a wholly independent monitor.199 This regulatory staffer
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pointed out that the first thing a firm often does, when it gets into trouble with a
regulator, is to retain outside counsel or an accountant to conduct an internal review.
Where credible outside counsel has already done substantial work on the problem, it can
be burdensome and largely pointless to require the firm, as a term of a settlement, to
bring another party in to redo the same work. For example, as soon as the DOJ started
investigating Bristol-Myers Squibb, the company hired Frederick Lacey, a former US
Attorney and federal judge, to review the company’s compliance program and internal
controls as an independent advisor.200 A year later, in a settlement agreement with the
SEC, the company agreed to retain Lacey as an independent advisor.201 The following
year Lacey became an independent monitor for the company under the DPA with the
DOJ.202 Although Lacey had earlier been retained by the company, this apparently did
not affect his independence since he later recommended that the company terminate the
employment of the CEO that had hired him.203
A civil-side regulator interviewee also told us that staffers recognize that a multiyear ban on subsequent business relationships between monitor and firm can be a
burdensome requirement for all involved – the consultant as well as the firm. As a result,
that regulator no longer automatically requires this as a condition of every monitorship.
There may be other factors that constrain independence – for example, if the decision is
made that the monitor must have extensive experience in the industry, or must have
specialized expertise, there may be a limited number of potential monitors that are
qualified and willing to take on the engagement. In those situations, a monitor’s prior
business relationships with a subject firm may not necessarily be a disqualifier. The
appropriate question is whether the level of independence is sufficient, not whether it is
complete. As one regulator described it,
There were enough questions about the management and the firm
that we weren’t just going to rely on their representations. We wanted
somebody independent of the firm to verify. So we wanted a more formal
auditor relationship and the sufficient independence of that was satisfied.
Basically if you’re independent enough to be their financial auditor then
that was sufficient for this engagement. It didn’t have to be somebody
in-house compliance department to conduct a review or audit, and then to certify that
changes have been made. … Maybe we would have the firm’s outside counsel do it
instead sometimes. At the other end of the spectrum is the “big fix,” where we might
require the firm to hire an independent consultant. As a term of the settlement, that
independent consultant would be precluded from working with the firm after this
engagement, maybe for a period of two years. Maybe we’d put an independent person on
their Board of Directors that they’d have to report to.
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brand new. And that it was - the context with their industry experience was
an important factor for us.
For those involved in the process, the degree of independence was not a central
concern. Both regulators and monitors told us that, ultimately, the monitors’ own
professional reputation and integrity were what made them behave responsibly in the role
and avoid being captured.204
B.

Selecting the Monitor
1.

Selection Process

Monitors are selected through a variety of methods. In most cases the DOJ selects
the monitor, often after “consultation” with the company,205 or the DOJ and the company
select a monitor who is “mutually agreed upon.”206 In other situations, the company
selects a monitor and the government retains a veto right.207 In at least one case the court
has selected the monitor from a selection of three candidates agreed to by the corporation
and the government.208 The monitors we spoke to were selected through several of these
options.
The Morford Memo approves of the use of any of these methods, though –
reflecting the memo’s origins in the scandal surrounding John Ashcroft’s appointment as
a monitor by a US Attorney’s office – the government’s final selection cannot be made
solely by the US Attorney but must be through an ad hoc committee, and final approval
must be given by the Deputy Attorney General.209 In the three cases since that memo,
however, the DOJ has used the veto method of selection.210 The debate about monitor
selection methods has even reached Congress, as one proposed bill seeks to require the
DOJ to use an open competition for monitorships.211
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Significantly, the monitor is typically selected after the settlement agreement has
been negotiated and signed. This takes the identity of the monitor out of the initial
settlement negotiations. It puts the company in the interesting position of agreeing to a
contract, one essential element of which remains undetermined.
During a selection process where the company is afforded some significant voice
in the process, it is not uncommon for potential monitors to make a presentation to the
company. This interview process gives the company the opportunity to determine
whether a particular monitor has the personality, skills, and experience, necessary to
provide value to the company, as well as achieving the government’s objectives. Our
research does not answer the question of whether the DOJ also interviews potential
candidates, although none of our interviewees told us that they had been so interviewed.
However, at least one monitor we spoke with was aware of instances in which the
government had exercised its “veto” power and rejected a company’s choice of monitor,
either because of a perceived conflict of interest or because the proposed monitor was not
thought to have the necessary qualifications. The next section turns to the qualifications
of those monitors.
2.

Monitors’ Background and Experience

There are several common traits among monitors. One common trait, especially
on the criminal side, is the lack of experience in conducting a monitorship. Many
monitors seem to have been retained for only a single engagement. If the government
continues its use of monitorships, then experienced monitors may become more common.
For example, Timothy Dickinson served as the monitor in Monsanto and was recently
selected as the “independent consultant” for Delta & Pine in a settlement with the SEC.
George Stamboulidis served as the monitor for Merrill Lynch and Bank of New York. In
addition, he serves as a “private monitor” for other companies, which presumably also
gives him valuable experience as a monitor. He estimates that he spends seventy percent
of his day as a monitor in some form.212 On the civil side, for a fairly small community of
lawyers, SEC or FINRA monitorships and corporate internal investigations more
generally form a substantial part of their practice.
On the other hand, some fear that the selection process will often not favor
experienced monitors. For example, one observer had the following perception of the
selection process (though others we spoke to disagreed):
Typically an Assistant US Attorney or an Assistant District
Attorney will leave to go into private practice; a case will come up in the
office where they’ll decide to do a deferred prosecution agreement.
Somebody will call the guy who’s left and say “Hey Charlie would you
like to do this?” And he says “Sure.” Looking for business, it’s sort of like
being a prosecutor again, sounds interesting and so he does it. That’s how
he gets appointed; somebody knows him, he’s a friend. And that may be
the only one he does for his entire life…
their selection that further the goal of creating “an open, public, and competitive process for the selection of
such monitors.” Id. at §5(c).
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A second common trait is that monitors are typically former prosecutors or other
government employees. From the list of forty monitors submitted by the DOJ to the
House Judiciary Committee on May 15, 2008, thirty were former government employees,
including 23 former prosecutors.213 A separate review of 25 monitorships found that at
least 17 were ex-prosecutors, and others included former federal judges, an SEC
Chairman, and an SEC General Counsel.214 The monitors we interviewed viewed their
backgrounds as a positive and highlighted their prosecutorial experience and their
presumed professional judgment as the most likely reasons for their selection. A number
of them also thought that their experience on “both sides” – i.e., as prosecutors and also
representing companies on white collar crime matters – equipped them to be monitors.
One monitor stated, “I used my professional experience and training as a prosecutor and
also as a defense attorney. You have to wear both hats, see things from different
perspectives.” Another described key skills as “[l]earning how to investigate and quoteunquote prosecute, tempering that with an understanding gained as a defense lawyer
about the mitigating and absolute defenses against certain conduct, and overlaying that,
appreciating that you have competing interests.”
Several people we interviewed raised concerns about the government selecting
ex-prosecutors as monitors. However, the typical case may not be the selection of a
former superior, as in the selection of John Ashcroft, or some other conflict of interest,
but the DOJ selecting someone they know, trust, and are comfortable working with. This
may result in a prosecutor selecting a former colleague to be a monitor, as suggested in
quote above. In addition, the company itself may select an ex-prosecutor in an attempt to
win the trust of the government and signal their willingness to comply with the settlement
agreement. One monitor stated,
I think the reason that you see so many people who do this who
have recently been in the government is really because they have a
credibility component and an independence component from the
perspective of the regulator who has to approve them. … [I]f you are the
company looking to retain somebody, you want to have somebody the
regulator is going to view as a credible force. … [Y]ou sort of only have
one shot at it and you want a household name about whose integrity no
one is going to call in to question . . . .
Another monitor said,
I think the comfort level that the government might have in the
monitor is important not only to the government but the more credibility
the monitor has with the government the better off the company can be too
because if the company has a monitor who has done an effective job and
has made recommendations that are going to be received and accepted by
the government, that’s good for all concerned.
In addition to their prosecutorial or regulatory experience, monitors commonly
assumed that they were selected for their knowledge of the substantive law related to the
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wrongdoing in question, and their experience in that industry or with similar
corporations. When asked whether compliance program professionals215 could be
effective monitors, many of the monitors we interviewed were skeptical. The primary
basis of that skepticism was the view that compliance management professionals do not
have the necessary “legal expertise.” In general, the monitors were not concerned that
they themselves did not have experience in corporate compliance or similar managerial
positions. As one monitor pointed out,
[l]awyers do this type of work all the time, they’re used to bringing
in the necessary experts to assist their role, so if the monitor needs a
compensation specialist they can always bring one in. Lawyers know how
to bring in people to augment their work.
Not surprisingly, compliance consultants we interviewed raised concerns about
the heavy use of ex-prosecutors and similar attorneys as monitors. Their primary
concerns related to these monitors’ lack of experience in implementing and evaluating
compliance programs in a way that takes into account how those programs are embedded
in the corporation’s culture. Although a lawyer experienced with the FCPA, for example,
can provide necessary expertise on policies the company needs to adopt to avoid
violating the law (e.g., what risks to be aware of, what types of payments are not
defensible), that expertise may be insufficient to ensure that the corporation’s employees
actually comply with those policies. This is where issues related to a corporation’s culture
(e.g., incentives, social norms) are important for understanding future compliance. Thus,
the changes implemented may not be sufficient to have a long-term impact on the
corporation.
To illustrate these concerns, one consultant brought up the old joke of a person
dropping her keys in the middle of the street but looking for the lost keys at the side of
the road by a street lamp. When asked why she was looking there, she responds “because
that’s where the light is.” As applied here, it means that monitors without experience in
establishing compliance programs will rely on what they do know216 or, as discussed
further below,217 will rely on indicators that are easy to measure but may be misleading.
Although monitors may bring in teams of professionals with the skills and
experience that the monitor lacks, this may not reassure all compliance consultants. First,
the monitor may not understand the relevant professional experience they lack. In a
published interview, a member of the original commission that worked on the 1991
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines criticized high-profile monitors, stating they “lack
background or, frankly, interest in understanding the substantial body of compliance best
practices.”218 Second, as one compliance consultant pointed out, the corporation must pay
the bill to bring in these other parties even though it has little or no control over who the
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monitor hires and how many billable hours they can charge. To the extent that the
monitor must learn on the job and bring in outsiders as part of this learning process,
corporate officers may come to resent the process. This can impact the monitorship’s
legitimacy and its chances for long-term success. This is perhaps especially true if a
monitor is selected simply for his or her name recognition, which is done presumably to
add credibility.
If, as the Morford Memo states, one of the key roles of the monitor is to ensure
that the company adopts an effective compliance program,219 then experience with
compliance programs from a managerial perspective would seem to be an essential
qualification for most monitorships. As a former prosecutor stated:
One of the reasons why the deferred prosecution agreements
require a monitor to be put in place is that the prosecutor's office has no
experience or skills to analyze whether a company is reforming its internal
governance practices. That's just not something that prosecutors do.
Instead, they need to find someone who does understand corporate forms
and operations, and has the time and resources to monitor the company's
progress.
This statement, which is uncontroversial, seems inconsistent with the decision to
consistently choose individuals with only prosecutorial or technical legal expertise with
respect to compliance programs.
C.

Conducting the Monitorship

In the course of a monitorship, the monitor develops a work plan, conducts his
investigation, advises the organization as to what changes are required, evaluates the
implementation and effectiveness of those changes, and produces a report containing his
evaluation and recommendations. Over the next two years or so, the monitor is often
required to conduct annual follow-up evaluations with formal written reports. In this
section, we take a closer look out how monitors conduct these activities.
1.

Developing and Implementing a Work Plan

A monitorship typically begins with the development of a work plan. The work
plan sets out who the monitor will interview, what documents she will review, and the
other work of the monitor and her team. Significantly, in many cases the work plan is
developed after the settlement agreement has been finalized and the monitor appointed,
often by the monitor herself on a rolling basis. In other cases the work plan is negotiated
with the company and the government. One interviewee had the impression that
negotiated work plans, developed in advance of the start of the monitorship, were
becoming more commonplace.
The negotiation of a work plan has occurred both formally and informally. The
settlement agreement itself can require the joint development of the plan. For example, in
the Baker Hughes DPA, the agreement specified a process under which the monitor
submitted a work plan to both the company and the DOJ for their comments before the
project began.220 All three of the monitorships entered into since the Morford Memo have
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required that the monitor submit a work plan to both the company and the DOJ for
comment.221 In other cases, monitors reported taking the initiative and calling a meeting
with the company and DOJ to ensure everyone had a clear understanding of expectations.
Finally, the company may take the initiative. One monitor stated that as part of his
presentation to the company during the company’s selection process, he described the
work plan he would implement.
In developing a work plan, the monitors we spoke to told us they generally used
the settlement agreement to establish the bounds of their investigation, and stated they
would not take on tasks that would go outside their duties as stated in the agreement. The
terms of the agreement, however, may contain substantial room for interpretation by the
monitor.
One area open to interpretation is whether and how to investigate the
corporation’s culture. As stated earlier, settlement agreements do not contain language
explicitly charging the monitor to provide recommendations on managing a corporation’s
culture, but some monitors recognize the importance of corporate culture and assume
responsibility for making recommendations on those issues. For example, the monitor in
the AOL case, James Robinson, and two colleagues who worked on the monitorship with
him, published an article describing their views on how a monitor should conduct his
work.222 In the article, they state that the AOL DPA tasked the monitor with a “mandate
to review and monitor a compliance culture as it relates to business practices and revenue
recognition.”223 The paragraph cited by Robinson as giving the monitor this mandate
states that the monitor shall review “the effectiveness” of AOL’s “internal control
measures,” “training related to these internal control measures,” AOL’s “sign-off and
approval procedures,” and the “corporate code of conduct.”224 One of our interviewees (a
monitor operating under a comparable mandate) expressed a similar view, and perceived
a similar link between compliance program policies and procedures and the corporation’s
culture:
I wasn't appointed to change the corporate culture at [company].
That said, the broad topics that I was there to examine and report on went
deeply into the culture and required me to sort of make observations about
the culture and about how it influenced the compliance of the company,
and as a consequence, at least, my perception was dealing on almost a
daily basis with questions of corporate culture.
Although it is unclear from Robinson’s article what these monitors did to examine
or review their company’s “compliance culture,” their direct discussion of culture
suggests a distinctly different approach from some other monitors. For example, when
one monitor we interviewed was asked about reviewing the company’s culture, the
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monitor told us, in effect, that it was hard to even know what the term meant. The
monitor observed that he could objectively look at processes and procedures, but that if
he wanted to be able to measure results it would be difficult to even determine how to
measure corporate culture. That monitor speculated that some other monitorships might
be concerned with corporate culture, but that his monitorship was intended to be limited.
Interestingly, the settlement agreement that monitor was working under charged the
monitor with essentially the same duties as the AOL monitor, focused around reviewing
new internal controls.
Even among those monitors who consider themselves to be engaging with issues
of corporate culture, it is unclear whether their use of the term matches the use of the
term by compliance professionals. In his article, the AOL monitor used the phrase
“compliance culture” but he did not specifically discuss how, if at all, his team attempted
to measure the corporation’s culture. That monitor’s approach may or may not be
consistent with current best practices from the perspective of compliance professionals.
For example, a common term in settlement agreements requires the company to
implement some form of anonymous hotline to allow employees to report wrongdoing. If
the monitor views her task very narrowly, then she will simply ensure that the hotline has
been implemented, that it is being monitored (perhaps by someone who reports to the
audit committee), and that employees are made aware of the hotline through training.
Although reviewing policies and procedures can ensure the hotline has been
implemented, it tells the company very little about its effectiveness. For example, many
employees refuse to report significant wrongdoing to hotlines due to a belief that the
organization will do nothing to correct the problem and a fear of retaliation, even if the
hotline is anonymous.225 Unless the monitor has a sense of the organization’s culture and
the pressures and social norms related to reporting wrongdoing, the monitor will not
know whether the hotline is an effective tool.
Likewise, reflecting the comment made earlier about looking for keys under the
lamp post because that is where the light is, a monitor who is not a compliance
professional may misconstrue information coming in about the corporation’s culture. For
example, in a published interview, one attorney who later served as a monitor stated that
the fact that a company’s hotline was rarely used by employees—and when it was used it
was for minor, personal matters— provided evidence of a positive corporate culture.226
Compliance consultants we interviewed, however, seem universally to agree that the use
or non-use of a hotline is not a good indicator of a corporation’s compliance culture or
measure of the level of wrongdoing within the organization. Instead, to get a sense of the
corporation’s culture, they would recommend using surveys, focus groups, and other
similar measures.227
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Overall, we found significant variation in how monitors conducted their work. All
seemed to review documents related to policies and procedures. All monitors also
conducted interviews, but some stated that it was unnecessary to talk to employees below
upper management. Those latter monitors focused solely on the “tone at the top,” which
can create a biased view of the organization.228 With respect to lower level employees,
those monitors seemed to focus simply on removing the wrongdoers. Other monitors,
however, conducted one-on-one interviews with employees at various levels of the
company on the view that people were more likely to be candid in that environment, and
even engaged in “surprise” visits to branch offices to interview employees before
management had a chance to prepare for them. In addition, some did not rely solely on
interviews to understand the company, but sat in on meetings where decisions were
made. Some intervened in corporate decisions early, while others tried to remain more in
the background, on the belief that:
… what you want to do … is to allow the business and compliance and
legal people to tackle it and to observe how they tackle it. And then to
intervene if and only if they're not handling it properly, and then, finally,
report to the government on it, how it all went, rather than run to the
government when an issue first arises and seek government intervention or
seek yourself to impose the solution, because then you're not teaching the
company anything.
In sum, how monitors view their obligations under the terms of the settlement
agreement will influence how they establish a work plan, which will influence the
information they collect, who they interview, and what aspects of the organization’s
operations they investigate. This shapes the entire nature of the monitorship (and in some
cases the choice between what we identified earlier as the Auditor and Associate roles),
and ultimately what recommendations they make and how they report their findings.
These decisions seem to be based more on the background and experience of the monitor
than on the terms of the settlement agreement or the negotiations leading up to the
settlement agreement.

prescribed, fill-in-the-box procedures,” but is a flexible process using the tools listed above to get a
complete picture of the organization. Id. at 8, 10.
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In making these decisions, monitors learn by trial and error (at the company’s
expense) and without the benefit of other monitors’ experience. The monitors we
interviewed typically were not able to supplement their knowledge by consulting with
other monitors, except rarely and on an ad hoc or informal basis, before developing work
plans and starting monitorships of their own. Nor could they rely on other monitor reports
as guidelines, as most were non-public. Several monitors expressed a strong desire for a
forum in which to share their insights and learn from the experiences of other monitors.
Without efforts by the government to attempt to capture the lessons of monitorships,
however, it seems unlikely to occur on its own. Government intervention may be needed
because some monitors may only conduct one monitorship and have little incentive to
participate, while others that may seek additional monitorships in the future may view
such information as proprietary.229 For example, one monitor stated:
I think there’s also the dynamic that people are competing with
one another …. It’s kind of like in your world, you know the other people
who are in your space. Sometimes you collaborate with them, sometimes
you don’t.
2.

Impacting the Organization

The mere presence of a monitor has the potential to create significant change in
how the corporation approaches its internal controls and compliance and ethics program.
First, it forces the company to direct attention and resources to compliance and ethics.230
For some corporations, compliance programs are simply a cost that that they try to
minimize. The company seeks to “buy” just enough of a compliance program that it has
some protection in the event that internal wrongdoing comes to light.231 The settlement
agreement and presence of a monitor forces such corporations to direct more resources to
this function and in some cases even to hire an officer for a new position of Chief Ethics
and Compliance Officer (CECO), or develop a compliance committee on the board of
directors.232 Second, the monitor can grant legitimacy and power to the CECO. As noted
earlier, the CECO may sometimes be pressured to end investigations or otherwise not live
up to the job’s requirements.233 The monitor gives the CECO more clout to resist that
pressure. For example, one CECO reported using the monitor to ensure that management
and the board would support what the CECO wanted to do. By putting the CECO’s
recommendations in the monitor’s report, the monitor essentially forced management and
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the board to agree to a plan they might have otherwise resisted.234 Likewise, one
interviewee stated:
There will be competing views within the corporation. The lawyers
in the corporation may not have the standing that they ought to, and they
may take one position, the business people may take another, and the
[monitor] is in a position where he can, forgive the whole phrase, speak
softly, but carry a big stick.
Third, the presence of a monitor can be a sufficiently disruptive force to cause the
company to conduct a meaningful re-evaluation of its practices. One monitor noted that
because there was a “cop on the beat” at the corporation, employees started to act as they
ought to under the compliance program. Eventually, the monitor hoped, appropriate
social norms would develop and, due also to the other reforms, officers and employees
within the corporation would continue to act that way after the monitor was gone.235
Although the presence of the monitor can have an immediate impact, to sustain
this impact over the long-term the corporation must be committed to the underlying
reform goals behind the monitorship process, or at least the idea of adopting a meaningful
compliance program. To do this, the monitors agreed that there must be some degree of
buy-in from the corporation and trust between the monitor and corporation. As mentioned
earlier, there is always the potential for corporate resentment to the monitor’s presence
and the costs they are imposing on the corporation. To get the necessary buy-in, some
monitors commented on the need to have a meaningful dialogue with the company, as
opposed to simply lecturing the company.236 Some monitors believe (and many
compliance professionals agree) that if reforms are to have a lasting impact, they need to
be the product of an endogenous learning process at the company, and not imposed in a
top-down manner.237 This approach appears to be in significant contrast with the
approach used by Richard Breeden at WorldCom. Mr. Breeden’s Restoring Trust report
seemed to consist of his own views as to what that corporation needed to do, as opposed
to working with the management team to develop solutions with them that made the most
sense for that company. Of course, one could argue that WorldCom was so pervasively
corrupt that a monitor’s only hope for success would be to adopt an Autocrat role. Yet, at
least one monitor we spoke with described a decision to define the assignment in direct
distinction to the Breeden model:
Well, I don't know that much about how Mr. Breeden went about
his job, but reading his report led me to think that he may have a different
view of how you handle this than I did. That is to say, I think, and maybe it
was a function of the company he was in, or the circumstances, I don't
mean to second guess him, but my impression was that he was much more
234
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coming up with solutions and imposing them on management than doing
the sort of advocacy that I advocate …. I would say that I set that
paradigm, if you will, and worked against it. Whether it's a fair
description of Mr. Breeden or not, I sort of created that image of how one
might do the monitorship and then I worked against it, because I didn't
think it was - as I got into my job - I didn't think it was the right way to
handle things. … But I hasten to add …that there are times when you've
got to say, this is the way it's going to be. When there's a serious problem,
or something that really requires immediate attention, or raises very clear
ethical issues. Plainly, under those circumstances, you don't wait around
or allow the company to take anything less than the completely ethical
position on a given issue.
3.

Accountability and Role Conflict

In addition to advising the corporation on its compliance program, the monitor is
also charged with monitoring the corporation’s compliance with the settlement
agreement, and may be under an obligation to disclose or investigate other relevant
instances of wrongdoing.238 Thus, the role contains inherent tensions.239
The majority of our monitor interviewees agreed that there was some tension built
into their role, but they thought it had a minimal impact on their work. Some monitors
pointed out that their role did not contain any more conflicts than the kinds of roles they
were accustomed to as lawyers and prosecutors. Others told us that the conflict was
minimal, either because everyone understood the monitor’s position as an independent
and credible third party, or because all parties ultimately wanted the same thing: for the
company to adopt an effective compliance program and for the monitor to be able to
verify that the evidence shows that such a program was in fact adopted. As discussed
further below, this smoothing over of the inherent tensions in the role may create other
problems.
In terms of accountability, the Morford Memo’s second principle states, “A
monitor is an independent third party, not an employee or agent of the corporation or of
the government.”240 The monitors we spoke with generally endorsed that position. While
DPAs are filed with the court, the monitors we spoke with did not report having a
significant relationship with the court. Some monitors suggested that they were generally
accountable to the relevant regulator or prosecutor, in the sense of writing their report for
that audience. Among the monitors we spoke to, however, many had concluded that in
their final analysis they were answerable only to themselves, and that their actions were
constrained by the desire to maintain their own professional reputation. This raised
concerns for others:
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monitors aren’t infallible, they can run amok, they can miss things,
they can overcharge, they can create more problems than they solve, and
they’ve got to be answerable to somebody.
4.

Reports and Follow-Up

At the completion of the initial investigation and during various other stages of
the monitorship, the monitor is required to draft a written report and present it to the
company and the government. Some monitors sought input from the company in drafting
the report. One monitor stated:
Sure, the monitor wants to write a good report that makes useful
recommendations; so if they show a draft to the company, the company
can say maybe you just got this one wrong, and we can show you
information that you made the wrong decision, and they will be able to
persuade the monitor or not. 5ot letting them talk is like a doctor giving a
pain reliever and not asking if it’s working.
In another case, the settlement agreement prohibited the monitor from
sharing the report with the company until a preliminary version had been
submitted to the government.241 Any concerns the company had with the report
were to be submitted in writing to the government and the monitor, and the
monitor could then respond to the comments as he saw fit.242
During their investigation and drafting of the report, the monitors had a
variety of experiences with respect to their interactions with the government.
Although some monitors indicated an ongoing dialogue with the government
independent of the company, others reached out to the government only if they
reached an impasse within the company. Still others indicated that their only
contact with the government was the submission of reports. In general, structured
input from the government during the monitor’s investigation and development of
the report did not seem to be the norm. Instead, the government simply reviewed
the report as submitted. The general impression was that these reports were read
closely and the government would have questions for the monitor. However, as
discussed below, no structured institutional mechanism existed for deploying or
leveraging the learning beyond that reading for that particular case. In one case—
Bristol-Myers Squibb—the settlement agreement required that the company,
including the CEO and general counsel, meet each quarter with the US Attorney’s
Office and the monitor in conjunction with the filing of the monitor’s reports.243
Such a formal meeting process seemed to be unique, however.
With few exceptions,244 the monitor’s report was not made public. There
are several arguments in favor of making the reports public. First, the reports
would allow monitors to learn from each others’ experience. Second, it would
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provide the greater compliance community with additional information on what
the government is looking for with respect to being able to demonstrate that a
compliance program is effective. Third, it provides greater accountability to the
public, since interested parties would be able to determine if corporations were in
fact rehabilitated, or if they “got off easy” for their wrongful behavior.
On the other hand, most monitors thought that a non-public report
provided significant benefits to the monitorship process. The primary benefit was
providing an environment for open communication, as stated by one monitor:
[T]the chances of identifying and observing . . . important issues
and corporate behavior go way up if your report isn’t going to be on the
front page of the business section of The 5ew York Times. You know,
people are going to be much more willing to even seek you out, or at least
answer your questions. I’ve found that there were people hungry to talk to
me when I did my job.
5.

Cause for Concern in Conducting the Monitorship

The combination of settlement agreement language that is open to interpretation
and the selection of monitors without a background in compliance and ethics programs
can lead to a monitorship that follows a simple Advisor or Auditor model regardless of
what the situation calls for. Under this model, the monitor looks for technical compliance
and the presence of the appropriate policies and procedures, but does not go deeper into
the workings of the organization to determine if those policies and procedures are
supported by an organizational culture that will ensure they are effective over the long
term. Although the Auditor model may be appropriate in some situations,245 for
organizations with a history of significant wrongdoing it does not ensure against the
possibility that the corporation only adopts a “paper program.”
This problem can be somewhat alleviated through a work plan, developed jointly
and in advance, which clarifies all parties’ expectations of the monitorship. It is unclear if
the joint, ex ante development of work plans is becoming standard practice. The work
plan, however, may still not force a monitor from an Auditor role to an Associate role.
The DOJ hires the monitor for its expertise in these areas. The prosecutors involved may
not know the right questions to ask or what is required for a successful work plan that
ensures the monitor adequately studies the organization’s culture. The corporation, which
wants to ensure it receives positive reports from the monitor and completes the
monitorship with minimal disruption and cost, may push for an Auditor role. In addition,
the selection of the monitor may not be providing the type of expertise needed, and
therefore the monitor is also not pushing for a deeper investigation. Thus, although the
settlement agreement may be drafted to ensure the corporation adopts an effective
compliance and ethics program, no one present during a work plan negotiation may be
pushing for what it would actually take to develop, implement, and test a compliance
program, based on best practices from compliance experts. This is not to say that
something akin to the Auditor model is never appropriate, but in situations where there is
widespread wrongdoing and significant reform is needed, the current choices seem to
245
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work against the more comprehensive Associate model being adopted when it would be
the most valuable model to use.
Furthermore, a corporation may argue that an expensive and lengthy monitorship
potentially required by the Associate model harms current shareholders.246 This would
mirror the criticisms of Sarbanes Oxley section 404 to the effect that the mandatory
procedures are expensive and provide little benefit.247 Instead of an expensive
monitorship, corporations can argue that they will agree to adopt and improve their
compliance programs, but that a monitor will not add much value beyond what they
would get from hiring a compliance consultant, for example. If a monitor is imposed, the
company will use those arguments to push for a more limited Auditor or Advisor role.
Multiplying these effects is the possibility that financial industry regulators will share
these concerns, along with a desire to move the case forward, close the file, and return the
corporation “to the fold.” This may partially explain the difference between the corporate
regulatory monitorships and those in the non-corporate (and especially RICO) context.
Corporations, unlike mob-ridden unions, attract a certain presumptive support from
professional regulators. They are not utterly “broken,” there is no public appetite for
government to “run” public corporations, and they serve important public and private
functions, so one should tread lightly.
D.

Termination and Post-Monitorship

Although settlement agreements commonly allow for the monitorship period to be
extended if needed or for the agreement to be terminated upon breach by the corporation,
thereby releasing the government from its obligations, monitorships seem to end when
the originally stated time expires. As one example, Bristol-Myers Squibb’s monitorship
ended at the expiration of its term, even though additional wrongdoing had been
discovered and the CEO was forced out due to involvement in that wrongdoing.248 The
monitor’s report, however, praised the company for its “reformation of the company’s
corporate culture into one that embraces and endorses a commitment to compliance,
ethics, integrity and excellence, and encourages open and participatory communication
throughout the organization.”249 The monitor also praised the company’s “outstanding
global compliance program whose policies, processes and procedures are designed to
ensure a culture of integrity and ethics that enables BMS to conduct its business
worldwide in compliance with all applicable laws, regulations and other governing
policies.”250 Strikingly, only a few months later, the company reached another settlement
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with the DOJ and paid over $500 million for wrongdoing related to fraudulent pricing
and marketing practices.251 As part of the new agreement, Bristol-Myers Squibb entered a
Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with the Office of Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services, which required the company to adopt
numerous compliance program features.252 Although some of the wrongful conduct
giving rise to this settlement occurred during the time the monitorship was in effect, the
US Attorney agreed to the settlement based in part on the monitor’s account of how the
company had improved its compliance program.253
Once a monitorship ends, ideally, as indicated by Jacobs in relation to union
trusteeships, a debriefing process should take place.254 This is a necessary process to
build a foundation of knowledge on what practices have worked and what have not, and
how the process can be improved. This is not being done, however, either through a
community of monitors or by the government.
The absence of meaningful follow-up means it is difficult to vouch for the
accountability or success of monitorships. As one of our interviewees memorably put it,
Maybe it turned out okay, maybe it didn’t, maybe nobody knows,
because there’s nobody out there evaluating these things. And unless a
company gets caught doing something improper again nobody may find
out whether the deferred prosecution agreement worked or didn’t work.
Although our analysis has generally discussed criminal-side and civil-side
monitorships together, there are significant differences in the contexts in which the
monitorships are enacted that should be taken into account. Most important, unlike a
regulator, a criminal prosecutor does not have the institutional structure for following up
on a monitor’s report. Several of the civil side regulators we spoke to told us that their
organizations’ practice was to pass monitors’ reports onto their compliance/examinations
departments, which would use the reports as blueprints for subsequent compliance
examinations and audits. This means that individuals with expertise in at least auditing
firms for compliance have regular opportunities to evaluate the firm’s or company’s
progress past the end of the monitorship. Prosecutors’ offices have no such structure built
into them.
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That said, even within the regulatory context, there is a clear distinction between
regulated entities and public companies, in terms of the kind of follow-up and oversight
they can expect. Broker dealer firms and other regulated entities operate in a highly
regulated environment and are required to be in contact with their regulators through a
number of prescribed mechanisms. Nothing similar is required of public companies as a
condition of listing – and most people would probably agree that nothing similar should
be required.255 Given that public companies are not going to be closely regulated,
monitorships may need to provide more explicitly for meaningful follow up, including
perhaps longer terms for the monitorships themselves. Without such follow up, it is
difficult to determine if a monitorship had any long-term impact short of evidence to the
contrary from a similar compliance problem emerging at the same company.
V.

Toward More Meaningful Monitorships
A.

Monitorships in Theory and in Practice

Earlier we placed monitorships on a continuum with four general categories—
Advisor, Auditor, Associate, and Autocrat—showing the range of possibilities from the
least ambitious monitorship to the most ambitious.256 Typically, it appears that the
government does not intend for the monitor to serve an Autocrat role, and with a few
exceptions monitors have not taken on such a role. At the other extreme, an Advisor role
may be appropriate where the government is comfortable that the wrongdoing is not
widespread throughout the organization or being intentionally (or unintentionally)
encouraged by the organization’s culture. Thus, an investigation may show that the
wrongdoing was in fact due to just a few rogue employees, and an Advisor is necessary
to help the corporation modify its compliance program and internal controls
appropriately, as well as to ensure that appropriate resources are directed to the
compliance program. In such a case, only technical adjustments to a company’s policies
or procedures are deemed necessary. Perhaps such a case should not even be termed a
“monitorship,” as independence may not be necessary.257
The Auditor role is one step above the Advisor, and may be called for in
substantially similar situations but where the government (1) has less confidence in the
corporation’s ability or desire to make the needed changes; or (2) has been impressed by
observed compliance program changes made by the corporation during the course of the
investigation leading up to the settlement.258 In cases where the wrongdoing spreads
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beyond a small number of individuals or there is evidence that organizational pressures or
social norms were key contributing factors to the wrongdoing, then the Associate model
may be needed. Under this model, the monitor investigates the root causes of wrongdoing
– including all facets of the organizational culture – and collaborates with the corporation
in a discursive, open-ended investigative project. There appear to be some cases where
this is occurring.259
In the appropriate situations, the Associate model is the kind of monitorship that,
in theory, 260 offers the greatest possibility of long-term, meaningful reform of corporate
operations, as compared to the other models and the simple use of sanctions and other
deterrence-based fines. Unlike financial sanctions, monitorships cannot be dismissed as
just a “cost of doing business.” Instead, monitorships should work toward
institutionalizing a self-reflective process within corporations that will address underlying
causes of misconduct in the organization and implement, and then continually revise, an
effective compliance program that is embedded within the organization’s culture. What
makes them so promising in theory is that they are an institutionalized, structured
mechanism for disrupting other, problematic institutions and structures. Disrupting
existing ways of doing things also can help to reform a corporation, because sweeping
away or rejecting the status quo can open up a space for reconsidering fundamental
assumptions.261 Without the monitorships, this process of change is unlikely to occur in
many corporations.262 For example, as one of our interviewees stated,
The greatest problem to effect change is the inevitable loss of
momentum that occurs inside an entity once the crisis has passed. Just the
everyday pressures that exist to do whatever business it is, to deal with
whatever crisis there is, gets in the way of actually completing whatever it
is people agree is the right thing to do. So having an independent
consultant involved in the process puts a framework around it, just like
program management does to cause ordinary change to take place. You
need the discipline of someone outside the organization who's got a
timeline, who's got to report to somebody. You have to have an end date.
independent advisor the company hired to review their compliance program during the investigation stage
was later hired as their monitor. See supra notes 200to 203 and accompanying text. A full consideration of
the issues raised by this proposal is beyond the scope of this paper.
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When you have those things, then you've managed to meet all the
milestones and get it done.
Monitorships require the corporation to pay direct attention to the reasons for its
past compliance failures and, with the prodding of a capable monitor, rehabilitate itself.
This process should separate the reform effort from the enforcement action and allow a
deep and demanding, but flexible and open-ended reform process to evolve as needed
over a period of time.263 By separating enforcement and reform, corporations are
expected to take a less adversarial stance and engage in less calculated cooperation,264
and instead engage in a more open and discursive process that has a better chance of
gaining company buy-in to the process. In the background, the “big stick” of
enforcement should help ensure the corporation is taking the process seriously.265
In practice, however, monitorships that have the goal of reforming corporations
are at risk of falling short. They rarely appear to be doing what compliance consultants
would say is necessary to ensure the corporation’s compliance program is effective and
will result in reforming a corporation’s culture over the long term. They also seem to be
failing at generating the necessary self-reflective process. Even in cases where there is
widespread wrongdoing within the organization, it seems the monitor is typically
assuming the narrower Auditor role over the more in-depth Associate role. In this section,
based on the evidence we have,266 we explain why this may be occurring. This is not to
say that successful monitorships do not and cannot happen where the Associate model is
required, but that those successes seem to be due to self-motivated individual efforts and
not due to an effective system that produces consistent results.
A key potential cause is that the incentives and motivations of the three actors
involved in the monitorships (the company, the government, and the monitor) can come
together in such a way that the monitorship process settles for a significantly lower level
of operation and ambition than we would hope for. Although the parties’ interests may be
aligned in the ways described above,267 they may not be aligned with the long-term best
interests of shareholders or the public.268 Specifically, the corporation wants a
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place in the organization, so it makes it very easy if that’s the case. But it’s not

51

monitorship that is just rigorous enough to allow the monitor to write a report that can
satisfy the government; it does not want a monitorship that is broader in scope or more
expensive than it has to be. The monitor wants to conduct an investigation that will
enhance or at least not adversely affect her professional reputation and oversee a
compliance program implementation that allows her to write a credible report for the
government. Interestingly, if the use of monitorships continues to increase, some
monitors seek to obtain future monitorship appointments, and the company has some
meaningful say in the selection of the monitor,269 then monitors may actually come to
operate in a more company-friendly manner. According to compliance consultants we
interviewed, because the monitor has an eye to her next appointment, she may be careful
about implementing too onerous a monitorship. Even if a monitor is not seeking
additional monitorships, she may still conduct a company-friendly monitorship because
of the natural tendency to view the corporation as a client, and the desire to “add value”
for that client.270
The government also may not push the monitor and the company to go beyond a
basic Advisor or Auditor model of monitorships. The prosecutor wants to close his file in
a way that is reasonably calculated to ensure that the subject corporation has at least
decent, industry-standard compliance processes in place (at least on paper), and then
move on to the next case. The prosecutor does not want similar problems to recur at the
same firm in short order, but separate fines and sanctions against individuals can go some
distance here too. On the other hand, mindful of criticisms about monitors running amok,
the prosecutor does not want to be unreasonable or to force the company, or more
specifically its shareholders, to incur costs that are more burdensome than they have to
be.
The end results of these factors can be relatively conservative monitorships
focused on technical compliance with policy and procedure requirements. There is little
interest in a drawn-out, discursive process and no one seems to have an incentive to
attempt a “deep dive” into issues of corporate culture. Even if the corporation itself may
be motivated to do so, it may rationally choose not to deal with such issues with a
corporate monitor that is not in an attorney-client privileged relationship with the
corporation. Thus, despite any initial aspirations, the pressure on the monitorship
structure is downward – toward the Advisor or Auditor model.
necessarily true. A deferred prosecution agreement may be put in place because that’s
the easiest way to bring a criminal case to a conclusion and the people who are running
the company feel that they are getting off lightly. … it’s the culture that determines how
people are going to behave in the organization, not any particular individual. Unless you
bring about cultural reform you’re probably destined to repeat some form of misconduct
at some point in the future as soon as the pressure is off.
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The three monitorships since the Morford Memo have all allowed the corporation to pick the monitor
with the government retaining a veto power.
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Clearly, an effective compliance program can and should add value to a company, and even compliance
consultants market themselves as claiming to add value to the company. There will be situations, however
– especially here, in the enforcement context – where appropriate implementation of a compliance program
requires some tradeoffs between at least short-term value and accountability. Monitors must ensure that
they are considering not just company value and company concerns, but ensuring accountability to the
government and the public more generally.
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A second major cause of low-ambition monitorships—which also impacts the
motivation of monitors discussed above—is the type of monitor that is being selected. As
indicated earlier, the corporation wants to pick a monitor that has credibility with the
government, and the government wants a monitor it can trust. The end result is the
selection of a monitor that closely resembles a prosecutor’s profile (and commonly is an
ex-prosecutor), which deeply affects the subsequent path the monitorship takes. The
monitorship becomes a process designed by prosecutors, run by former prosecutors, and
for ultimate consumption by prosecutors. As one monitor pointed out to us, the
corporation only has “one shot at it,” and the stakes are high. It is not a time to take risks
when a consensus is emerging about what constitutes an acceptable monitorship. The risk
of a future problem emerging because underlying cultural issues have not been addressed
feels remote in the middle of an acute incident, and people tend to discount future risks in
favor of present needs in any event.271 In addition, without a system for tracking,
aggregating, and sharing experiential and outcome data between companies or between
US Attorney’s offices, the actors create the features of each monitorship in an
environment of uncertainty and are likely to simply follow the lead of those who came
before. In the end, with each subsequent monitorship, the conservative, technical
compliance-oriented model is reproduced through a process similar to what
organizational sociologists call mimetic isomorphism.272
B.

Reform Recommendations

The shift toward the Advisor and Auditor end of the spectrum is not necessarily
an intentional choice, but the result of choices along the way in a process that is
influenced by the various motivations and incentives of the actors involved. Returning to
our simplified four-stage monitorship model, we can identify decisions at each stage that
affect the subsequent possibilities and generally push toward a less ambitious
monitorship. These problems suggest various reforms to better structure a monitorship to
meet the needs of the case at hand and to develop systems to help ensure monitorships
improve over time.
At the negotiation stage, the terms of the agreement are drafted in a way that
leaves significant interpretation to the monitor. Although flexibility is one of the key
virtues of monitorships, their effectiveness calls for more careful and context-specific
thought upfront about the monitor’s exact role and the scope of monitorship. Second,
parties are selecting monitors with a prosecutor’s mindset and skill set, as opposed to
someone more closely identified as a compliance professional. Third, during the course
of the monitorship and as a function of the two choices made above, monitorships tend to
focus on technical compliance and easily measurable outcomes. Although we have been
unable to review monitor reports in the for-profit corporation setting, our estimation
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See David M. Messick and Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision
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discounting future events and related biases that exacerbate that problem).
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See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
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of mimetic isomorphism, which involves organizations copying each other in the face of uncertainty due
simply to the legitimacy established by the prior actor and not due to their fitness for the environment).

53

based on our interviews is that “corporate culture” is used more as a buzzword than as a
meaningful construct. Finally, at the post-monitorship stage, efforts to capture learning
from monitorships and apply it to other ones are virtually nonexistent. Instead, patterns
are reproduced from one monitorship to the next based on precedent, rather than clear
thought as to whether they are appropriate to the new situation.
In the remainder of this article we provide recommendations for reform at each of
these stages. We should note that our conclusions are limited in that we have had
virtually no access to monitor reports and we have only had contact with a small sample
of actors involved in monitorships.273 That said, even if more monitorships have been
deeper and more consistent with compliance industry knowledge than we surmised, the
systematic problems we identify are real in some number of cases and could easily
become the norm if they are not monitored and managed appropriately. In addition, these
reforms will not lessen the effectiveness of monitorship models that have been effective,
but will only work to strengthen them and improve the chances for success for all
monitorships.
1.

Crafting Monitorships for the Case at Hand

Once the government decides to agree to a monitorship, it needs to clearly
articulate the reasons that it came to that conclusion. In addition, and flowing from that
original rationale for the monitorship, the agreement should be more specific on what role
the monitor is expected to adopt. The challenge in many situations, however, is
determining the corporation’s reform needs before the monitor has started her work.
Currently, the government relies on its own investigation, which in turn relies
heavily on the company’s internal investigation. Many corporations conduct proactive
internal reviews when internal wrongdoing comes to light. An important policy reason
for granting corporations “credit for cooperation” is that it allows the government to
essentially outsource its investigations. As one interviewee stated, “[t]he good thing
about it is that it leverages the government’s resources. I mean, with a handful of
prosecutors you can be running many huge investigations of big companies, which if you
had to staff it with your own people you’d never be able to do.”274 These investigations
can be a valuable source of information. For example, they may demonstrate that a
corporation’s compliance program is clearly inadequate.275 However, internal
investigations are not equivalent to a monitor’s investigation and their context must be
taken into account. For our purposes, a central concern is that internal investigators are
motivated to identify individual “bad apples,” and away from identifying deep problems
of corporate culture.276 Thus, the government should not automatically assume, based on
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an internal investigation, that there is no need for a more ambitious, Associate-style
monitorship.
One possible solution is to follow the lead of the US Attorney in the Mellon Bank
case, who hired compliance consultants to investigate the company before she agreed to a
DPA.277 Although there are of course significant limits on the ability of such consultants
to determine the state of compliance at the time of the offense (which typically includes
acts that have occurred months or years ago), the consultants can investigate the current
state of compliance to make a recommendation as to whether they believe the company is
at risk of engaging in similar activity in the future. This recommendation can then be
used by the parties as they negotiate the terms of the settlement, including the role of the
monitor.
Next, to ensure the monitor conducts an appropriate investigation and follows the
desired monitorship model, the basic structure of a work plan should be incorporated into
the settlement agreement. This ensures that, where a complete and thorough investigation
of the company’s ethics and compliance program and organizational culture is called for,
this is actually what the monitor does. It also should help weed out potential monitors
who do not have skills and experience to conduct this type of investigation. In addition, it
may be useful to have some form of the final work plan made available to the public (in a
redacted form if necessary to protect any legitimate privacy concerns of the corporation)
for purposes of accountability and information sharing for future monitorships. This more
direct guidance upfront still allows the monitorship to develop and evolve in a manner
that meets the needs of the situation, but (along with other necessary reforms) helps
ensure that the monitor does not move to a lower ambition monitorship, such as an
Advisor or Auditor role, where the needs of the situation do not justify that move.
2.

Selecting the Monitor: Competency versus Credibility

One thing we heard from several monitors is that, ultimately, the success of the
monitorship comes down to the personal qualities of the monitor chosen. Several
monitors emphasized the importance of professional judgment. At its starkest, we heard
that it may be “impossible for monitorships to be institutionalized” because “[t]he kind of
self-restraint, the kind of self-critical analysis, the kind of self-discipline that you need to
be a monitor is very, very, very unusual and there’s nothing that really prepares you for
it.” This observer told us about the “intellectual and emotional discipline” required to do
the job:
You got to be prepared to pull the plug and quit, or you’ve got to
be prepared to turn on the people that you’ve come to like and feel are
supportive, or you’ve got to be prepared to defend people that you don’t
like depending on the circumstances that you find yourself in. And you’ve
got to do it in a way where every time you make a judgment, every time
you express yourself you can back up your conclusions with overwhelming

through the acts of senior management, identifies culpable employees and offers evidence against them in a
trade with prosecutors for corporate leniency or possible amnesty.”)
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evidence that you’re correct and you can’t afford to make a mistake, it’s a
zero defect kind of a role.
Accepting the difficulties of the job and the inherent tensions in it, there are still
steps that can be taken to increase the possibility of an effective monitorship. Of primary
importance is finding the monitor with the right skills for the monitorship at hand. The
Morford Memo is correct in stating that the corporation should maintain responsibility for
designing its compliance and ethics program because only corporate managers, and not
the monitor, have duties to shareholders.278 The point is not to have monitors take over
corporations and their compliance programs, because there can be more than one way to
implement a compliance program and each can be equally correct and effective. It should
be the corporation’s choice on which approach to take, as long as its choice is reasonable
and it can convince the monitor of the likely effectiveness of the proposed approach.
To determine this effectiveness, the monitor must have sufficient experience with
the workings of ethics and compliance programs in practice. This does not mean simply
technical compliance with legal requirements, but an understanding of how matters that
affect a corporation’s culture, such as rewards systems, impact the effectiveness of a
compliance program that looks complete on paper. These issues go to the heart of the
monitor’s effectiveness. Overall, as one compliance consultant told us, there is a reason
why the compliance profession has developed, and it is that lawyers focused on technical
compliance were not getting the job done.279 Because the monitor’s primary duty is to
ensure the corporation has an effective compliance program, then those with the
experience and skills to serve as a chief ethics and compliance officer should be the first
people to be considered for the position.
The current dominant use of ex-prosecutors and similar attorneys as monitors was
not a conscious choice resulting from a consensus that corporate compliance problems
will be addressed most effectively by using such monitors. The terms of the monitorship
agreements we reviewed do not specify this preference, and, indeed, the Morford Memo
explicitly states that non-lawyers can do this work.280 To address the ossification around
this model, the government must be involved in the selection process and implement
policies on the skills and experience a monitor should have, related to the growing body
of knowledge from compliance professionals.
In selecting the monitor, there also must be some balance between the
government selecting the monitor and the corporation selecting the monitor with the
government only retaining a veto power. If the corporation has too much control over the
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We are not saying that monitors whose primary experience is having been a prosecutor or white collar
defense attorney cannot get the job done (and there seems to be evidence that they can). What we are
saying is that the prosecutorial model of lawyering seems to be under-equipped to do this job in many
cases, especially those we have deemed appropriate for an Associate model of monitorship (See supra note
134 and accompanying text), and should not on its own be considered either a necessary or a sufficient
requirement for selection as a monitor.

280

Morford Memo, supra note 152.

56

process, then it may attempt to select monitors that are company-friendly. In addition,
there is the potential for the monitor to begin to view the company as her client,
especially if the monitor underwent an interview in which she had to convince the
corporation to hire her. If the government has too much control, then it may select
monitors through a process that raises legitimacy concerns (i.e., selected based on
personal connections rather than merit) or that will not work well with the company, and
as stated earlier, corporate buy-in and trust of the monitor are key factors for a successful
monitorship. Monitors should be selected through a process in which the parties select a
mutually acceptable monitor. In addition, during the post-monitorship review (we suggest
reforms in this area below), the government should collect data on the performance of the
monitors and ensure that information is available to those government officials involved
in the selection process.
Government involvement in the selection process—and greater contact with the
monitor throughout the monitorship—also should help ensure monitor accountability and
independence. The Morford Memo and most (but not all) DPAs place great importance
on structural independence (meaning a monitor who has no prior business relationship
with a firm, and who is precluded from taking one for a period of years after the
monitorship). This does not, however, ensure independence of mind. At a subconscious
level if not a conscious one, the fact that the company is paying the monitor may
motivate the monitor to try to convince the company that he or she is “adding value,” in
much the same way that in the rest of their practice these same attorneys want their
clients to see the value of the services they provide. Especially where the monitor is
working on a close and daily basis at the company, with little contact with the
government, the (conscious or subconscious) desire to have positive interpersonal
interactions with key players can become significant. Thus, structural independence must
be supplemented with other aspects of the monitor process, such as greater contact and
involvement with the government during the process. The government should be in
regular contact with the monitor and provide written feedback with its assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of the monitor’s investigations and reports.281
3.

Compliance for the Long Term

The goal of a monitorship is to ensure that the corporation implements an
effective ethics and compliance program. Although monitorships are typically 24 to 36
months in duration, they are expected to have an impact that lasts significantly longer.
The first step in accomplishing this is designing a monitorship that can assist the
corporation in uncovering root causes of misconduct, identifying persistent organizational
culture hurdles standing in the way of adopting an effective ethics and compliance
program, and assist in identifying and implementing effective measures in light of these
factors.282
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To ensure lasting change, the next step must be to entrench the changes made
during the monitorship into the operations and structure of the corporation. Susan Sturm
has described, in a different context, how the “architecture” of an organization needs to
be reconfigured to prevent backsliding at the end of an acute intervention like a
monitorship.283 Con Ed’s monitorship appears to be an example of exactly that
problem.284 In the context of forcing compliance reform on a corporation, a leading
example is the use of Corporate Integrity Agreements that require certain structural
changes.285 DPAs often require similar changes, such as the appointment of a Chief
Ethics and Compliance Officer or the selection of independent directors to serve on the
board committee with supervision duties over the compliance program.286
Thus, to help ensure that changes remain once the pressure is off,287 settlement
agreements where the Associate monitorship model is required should likely include the
following requirements. First, if the position does not already exist, the corporation
should appoint a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer and make that person part of the
company’s high-level management. Second, the CECO should be an agent of the board
of directors, at least as far as incentive compensation and termination decisions are
concerned.288 Third, the corporation’s board should be required to adopt a compliance
committee, and the CECO should have reporting responsibilities to that committee.289
During the course of the monitorship, the monitor should ensure that the CECO and
compliance committee are performing their duties competently. In addition, and as
discussed further below, information should be systematically collected on when and why
such requirements are used, and this information should be combined with data collected
by the monitor on how well these structural changes have worked.
4.

Post-Monitorship: Institutionalize Learning

One of the regulators we spoke with indicated that, with respect to the degree of
independence they required of the monitor, their organization had developed an informal
policy to help ensure that burdensome independence requirements were not imposed
where they were not necessary. This policy was apparently based, at least in part, on a
review of its past monitorships. However, this same regulator did not see a reason to
analyze the content of the monitors’ recommendations in the same overarching manner to
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see, for example, if insights could be generated for handling the most common
compliance failures, or if best practices in resolving common problems were starting to
emerge. Many of our interviewees had not contemplated that much valuable information
would come from this kind of exercise, especially considering the amount of work
involved.
We believe that the absence of systematic methods for capturing the lessons of
past monitorships is a major failing. As indicated above, the government must play some
role in this process. 290 Although monitors seek to have this information, they are
reluctant to provide it to others either because they view it as proprietary information or
they appropriately do not want to disclose confidential information about the corporation.
There are several reasons why there is a need to develop mechanisms to capture
the learning from monitorships.291 First, costs are reduced by new monitors not having to
reinvent the wheel for their monitorship. Monitors reported having no models to rely
upon for developing a work plan or even drafting their report, and corporations are
therefore required to pay the bill for their learning on the job. Second, to improve the
effectiveness of monitorships, an effort must be made to capture best practices and
review their evolution over time due to increased experience. Third, capturing these
lessons also allows the government (including US Attorneys without any experience with
monitorships) to become more knowledgeable and therefore more productive participants
in the monitorships along the lines suggested above, including negotiating the settlement
agreements, selecting monitors based on their skills and experience, and reviewing the
monitor’s work during the monitorship. This allows the four stages of a monitorship we
identified above to function as a cycle, where the lessons from past monitorships feed
into the next round of monitorships.
The lessons the government should attempt to capture include not just best
practices on the monitorship process, but also indicators on the final performance of
monitorships over time. This is vital information for determining if monitorships are even
working as a policy alternative. Overall, without an effort to analyze the experiences of
monitorships and attempting to distill the lessons to be learned, then certain ineffective
practices may become the standard without appropriate thought and evaluation.
VI.

Conclusion

Like others, we are concerned with the development of corporate monitorships.
Our concerns, however, have less to do with fears of unaccountable monitors running
roughshod over corporations and more to do with monitors not conducting deep dives
into the corporation’s culture. As stated by the Ethics Resource Center—a leading
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nonprofit conducting research on organizational ethics—“Ethical culture is the single
biggest factor determining the amount of misconduct in [an] organization.”292 Likewise,
to obtain the benefits of a mitigated sentence under the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines a corporation must “promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical
conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”293 In some cases, monitors are
dealing with these issues to at least some degree, but in others they are not. Not delving
into these issues may be the right decision in certain limited situations. In practice,
however, this determination has less to do with a well-thought-out strategy to match the
monitorship to the case at hand, and more to do with flaws in the monitorship process. In
cases where wrongdoing is widespread within the organization and social pressures
toward corruption are great, the monitor must investigate a corporation’s culture and
force the corporation to address these issues if monitorships are expected to have a
reliable impact on corporate behavior over the long term. We are not saying that
technical, compliance-based monitorships are never useful. Having in place appropriate
processes and procedures is important to corporate compliance and is the foundation of
an ethical corporate culture. Thus, all monitors serve an important function in making
sure that firms are structurally equipped to prevent and detect internal wrongdoing. What
we advocate, though, is a monitorship process that incorporates some of the learning that
has emerged from compliance professionals about the importance of organizational
culture. The reforms suggested here—including rethinking who is qualified to serve as a
monitor and capturing the lessons from experience—are simple steps toward creating
more ambitious and more consistently successful monitorships.
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